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1. Introduction
Major structural changes have been occurring in the
agricultural-food system (agro-food). The advanced
agro-food sector is considered as a chain of interrelated
activities from input suppliers to consumers while the
traditional view of agribusiness considered only
activities beyond the farm-gate. These changes are
driven by changes in food consumer preferences and
attitudes, technological improvements, food safety issues
and related regulations, and changes in the farming
structure.
In developed countries, it is observed that while the
importance of agriculture in population, national income,
export and employment has been decreasing, the share of
the processed food supply to the consumer is increasing
estimated to be about 60% of consumption on average.
In such a system, of course, the agro-food industry is
based on market oriented intensive agricultural
production and well coordinated and organized market
structure.
Vertical coordination has gained attention in the
food system as a device for providing both cost and
product quality advantages (Roy 1963). The agro-food
sector can be conceptualized as a system of vertically
interrelated stages. These stages are tied together
through a variety of activities and institutions ranging
from the sale of intermediate goods via arms length
transaction agreements to consolidation of two or more
stages under the common management of single firm
i.e., vertical integration. Briefly vertical coordination
encompasses all means of harmonizing vertically
interdependent production and distribution activities
ranging from spot markets through various types of
contracts to complete integration (Frank and Henderson
1992).
 Between these extremes, the one which entails the
most direct relationship between large corporations and
small farmers is contract farming.
This system is widely used in developed countries
where it accounts for about 15% of agricultural output
(Glover 1990). For instance, in the U.S., 32% of the total
value of agricultural production was produced under
contract arrangements (Perry et al. 1996).  In Japan, 75%
of broiler output was produced under contracts in 1989
(Yi et al.) In the EU, the production aid system has been
encouraging contract farming (Anonymous 1984). For
example, in Germany, vertical integration through
contract production is already common in dairy, poultry
and sugar processing accounting for approximately 38%
of the agricultural production (Grosskopf 1994).
Economies of the developing countries are mostly
agricultural based. Development of agriculture from a
traditional structure to a market oriented structure is the
major challenge for them. The main struggle is to
decrease the rate of population engaged in agriculture to
a certain amount through creating new employment
opportunities either in non-agricultural sectors; such as
textile industry, services sector etc., or agricultural based
industries such as food processing. For developing
countries, it is generally agreed that food processing is a
key industry which should receive high priority both at
national and international levels
 (Anonymous 1981).
Moreover, food industry development promotes
development in other sectors through forward and
backward linkages. In these countries, the food-
processing industry is important to economic growth and
to the health of people. Many food raw materials in these
countries are not fully utilized, foods are imported, food
shortages exist and diets are inadequate. Developing
countries such as Turkey must develop their food
resources more extensively (Anonymous 1969). The
development of the food industry not only provides new
job opportunities and increase national income via
accruing value added but it also is the way to supply safe
and adequate processed food to consumers.
One of the important pre-conditions for the
development of the food industry is the availability of
processed food demand in both domestic and foreign
markets. On one hand, the existence of plants which
have modern technology and are economically viable to
process agricultural produce is important. On the other
hand, providing continuous, safe and ample raw
materials is vital for the establishment of a sound food
industry. That is why the vertical relationship between
farm firms (i.e. growers and producers) and processors
or traders of agricultural commodities is very important.
Current efforts to improve agricultural performance
in developing countries tend to emphasize two
instruments: technological innovation and alteration of
macro policy framework (Glover 1987). Although both
are usually necessary conditions, institutional innovation
also has an important role to play. Acting in an
organized manner in agricultural production and
marketing will serve to create an efficient coordination
among the chains in the food system from producers to
consumers.
As a means of coordination; contract production has
traditionally been considered a feature of an advanced
capitalist agricultural structure but it also represents an
expanding and much suggested method of agro-
industrial integration for developing economies.
Contract farming has also been promoted over the last
three decades as an institutional innovation to improve
agricultural performance in less developed countries
sometimes as a key element of rural development and/orVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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settlement projects (Ghee and Doral 1992). It’s use in
developing countries such as Turkey has been
significantly increasing.
In the industrialized food system, the impersonal
structure of the free market mechanism is replaced by an
organized and controlled personal relationship varying
from short term contractual arrangements to complete
vertical integration. These methods of vertical
coordination of the advanced agro-food structure have
many advantages, but are subject to some inherent
implementation problems.
Related problems can be considered in two main
groups. First, complicated structural relationships
between the different stages in a vertical channel and the
actors in the channel require theoretical analysis. The
second group deals with practical issues. Which
conditions are needed for each type of coordination?
When and to what extent do such conditions occur? Who
will have the control of these coordinated systems? And
how will the benefits and risks of such a linkage be
shared among the participants ? These questions must be
answered. From the farmers’ point of view, reduced
independence and lack of market position in the more
concentrated raw commodities markets are problems that
require feasible, practical and fair solutions.
In this study, first, I review current vertical
coordination theories focusing on the theoretical
background of contract farming. Principle reasons for
contracting, advantages and failures of a contractual
relationship as well as different types of contract
production are examined in the light of integration
(coordination) theory.
Second, I will investigate the practical application of
contract farming to point out related problems and
required conditions for successful implementation based
on comparative analysis of experiences in Turkey and
the USA. The first is a developing country which has a
promising food industry and the second has a developed
industry which has a heavily industrialized food system.
The general structure of the food industry and
experiences of contract farming in the USA are
investigated based on the available publications and
empirical research. The general structure of the food
industry and contract farming in Turkey are studied
based not only on available publications and studies but
also the empirical data obtained by field survey. This
field  survey was conducted in a region where the main
food processing plants are located. In that survey 25
firms and 91 growers were interviewed. In addition, 25
examples of production contract were examined. A
breakdown of the 25 firms by sub-sector is as follows:
Vegetable oil, 2; frozen food,1; canning and tomato
paste, 13; dairy, 4; olive processing, 2; beet-sugar, 1;
hop processing, 1; other, 1.
Finally, development of a contract farming model is
proposed.
This study has five chapters. Chapter one serves as
an introduction. Chapter 2 presents a short review of
integration, vertical coordination concepts, vertical
coordination theories and contract farming. The general
overview of food industries and rather detailed
information about contract farming both in Turkey and
the USA are presented in chapter 3. A comparative
evaluation of findings about the general structure of food
industries and contract farming implementations in
Turkey and the USA are also given in chapter 3. Before
the conclusion and suggestions in chapter 5, a contract
farming model is presented in Chapter 4.
2. Theoretical Background of Vertical Coordination
and Contract Farming
2.1. Integration and Vertical Coordination
Primitive agriculture was a fully integrated system.
In subsistence agriculture, vertical integration is nearly
complete since most of the production resources and
production decisions are in the same hand (Penn 1958).
One family would collect seed, sow, and reap a crop,
rear and fatten an animal, and themselves consume the
produce after reserving seed or breeding stock for the
following year. The evolution from subsistence farming
to present market oriented agricultural system has been
marked by a gradual disintegration of functions.
Specialization is one of  the  distinguishing   features of
today’s commercialized agriculture.
Agriculture as a production industry is closely
related to marketing activities which transform,
transport, and transfer food and fiber to the consumer.
Additionally agriculture is served by a  large  number of
industries which are  supplying farm inputs.
Nowadays, coordination and/or integration between
farms and the others firms in the industry in different
dimensions is a reality. In other words, in advanced
agriculture, there is a strong tendency toward close
vertical coordination.
Integration means bringing together two or more
parts into one. There are three basic kinds of integration.
Vertical integration occurs when a firm combines
activities unlike those it currently performs which are
related to them in the sequence of marketing and
production activities. Such integration could be
illustrated by the meat packer who decides to reach both
backward, toward the producer by operating his own
livestock buying points in the countryside, and forward,
toward the consumer by operating his own meat
wholesaling firm (Kilmer 1986). A rather detailedVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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concept of vertical integration will be discussed later in
this chapter.
Horizontal integration occurs when a firm gains
control over the firms performing similar activities at the
same level in the production and marketing sequence.
Firms often expand both vertically and horizontally.
If both vertical and horizontal operations are tied
together this is called circular integration. Local dairy
cooperatives which are brought under a regional union
illustrate this. When organizing dairy farmers under a
dairy cooperative, vertical integration has occurred. At
the same time, if dairy cooperatives are organized under
a regional cooperative union, a horizontal integration has
occurred.
Another type of organizational expansion which
occurs when agencies or activities that do not have any
direct relation among them are brought under a unified
management, this is called conglomeration.
The terms vertical coordination, vertical integration
and contract production are often used interchangeably
(Cramer and Jensen 1988; Paarlberg 1995; Cramer et
al.1997). Of course vertical coordination is a rather
broad term which encompasses all means of
harmonizing vertically interdependent production and
marketing activities ranging from spot markets through
various types of contracts to complete integration (Frank
and Henderson 1992).
An efficient way to review vertical coordination in
one industry is by studying the extent of the transfer of
decision and the ownership of the firm assets. When all
the decisions and assets of the firms are taken under a
single firm’s control, that ownership is called ownership
integration or merger. Vertical integration is best
reserved for ownership integration where two or more
stages in the process of production and marketing are
effectively controlled by a single management. This
term also refers to a technological rather than  an
institutional development (Trifon 1959).
In contrast, when each firm retains its separate
identity but leaves one or more decisions of production
and/or marketing under the control of another firm, that
is called quasi integration or contract integration.
Sometimes it is called vertical restrictions. “A non-
integrated firm may write long-term, binding contracts
with the firms which it deals, in which it specifies price
and other terms. Such contractual restraints are called
vertical restrictions“ (Carlton and Perloff 1990, p. 502).
An agricultural production and marketing system
includes different stages or sectors: suppliers of input
items, farm operator, processor of farm products,
distributor, and final consumer. In the Western World,
the relationships and transactions between these sectors
could be realized in different manners (Allen 1972). In
agriculture, four types of vertical coordination between
farmers and off-farm businesses are generally
recognized (Berkama and Drabenstott 1995).
i. Coordination without any contract (market
coordination): The prevalent existence of spot market
or open market transactions is known as market
coordination. Spot market or traditional free marketing
system still accounts for the lion’s share of the present
world marketing system.
In this relationship there is no written or oral
contract between firm and the farmer for both buying or
selling. Here, the farmer buys supplies from whom he
chooses and sells his products to whoever will pay the
best price. This type of vertical relationship provides
freedom to farmers but uncertainties both in buying
supplies and selling produce are the main drawback. In a
competitive open (free) market system, price signals
control the market mechanism. The message reflected in
price would be passed back to the processor from the
final supply points (super markets or groceries ), to the
farmer and then to the supplier of input items. This
system may work very slowly.
This traditional form of market organization and
price determination will remain the appropriate means of
coordinating the links in the system if certain conditions
are available;
• Production occurs close to the points of final
consumption.
• Control over short term variation in prices and sale
volumes exist either through government or producer
organizations.
• Imprecise grading is acceptable for the purchaser.
• Agricultural extension and advisory services as
government functions are sound and effective.
For instance, contract farming rarely exists in grain,
oilseeds and cotton production which have been subject
to government price and/or income support programs.
Farmer contracts for delivery of a specific quantity at a
specific price, time, and place (ordinary forward and
futures contracts) are considered a part of market
coordination (Schrader 1986).
ii. Contract farming: This contract/integration
system is described as the most profound system
(Paarlberg 1995). Contract farming is sometimes called
quasi integration. British and American approaches are
different in this subject. British literature has drawn a
sharp distinction between contract farming and vertical
integration and regard one as an alternative of the other
(Barker 1972), preferring to restrict the meaning of
vertical integration to what has been called “ownership
integration”. American practice, in particular, has been
to regard contract farming as a form of vertical
integration (Allen 1972).Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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iii. Vertical integration: In this type of
coordination, each individual farm loses its identity and
becomes a company owned farm. The parent company
owns or leases the land, buildings and equipment and
employs its own employees. A firm can be described as
vertically integrated if it encompasses two single-output
production processes in which:
• The entire output of the first process is employed as
part or all of the quantity of one intermediate input into a
second process or,
• The entire quantity of intermediate input into second
stage is obtained from part or all of the output of the first
stage. This can be called as full integration
1.
This description may include more restrictive
criterion where the entire output of upstream process be
employed as the intermediate input into the downstream
process. It can be replaced the case in which most of the
output of upstream process is employed as most of the
input in the downstream process. This case is best
described as “partial vertical integration” (Perry 1989)
or taper integration. Thus, inherent in the notion of
vertical integration is the elimination of contractual or
market exchanges and the substitution of internal
exchange within the boundaries of the firm.
Vertical integration also means the ownership and
complete control over neighboring stages of production
or distribution. Grossman and Hart (1986) have argued
that vertical integration is the ownership and thus
complete control over the assets. But, because of the
different nature of the labor input, it is not relevant for
vertical integration. The workers could be employees or
contractors without altering the degree of vertical
integration.
On the other hand, Williamson (1973) and others
have stated that vertical integration would encompass
the switch from purchasing inputs to producing those
inputs by hiring labor. The required capital for
production, such as building and equipment, could be
owned or leased without altering the degree of vertical
integration. Leasing of capital can allow control of
production without ownership, but this approach is not
enough to explain vertical integration. Vertical
integration is control over the entire production or
distribution process rather than control over any
particular input into that process.
Vertical controls characterize vertical relationships
between the two extremes of vertical integration and
                                                       
1 Full integration refers to selling all of the outputs, or
providing all inputs in-house and taper integration refers to
selling some proportion of outputs to or buying some inputs
from outsiders (Harrigan 1986 p.538).
spot market exchange. A vertical control arises from a
contract between two firms at different stages which
transfers control of some, but not all, aspects of
production or distribution. However, vertical control and
quasi integration are intimately related to vertical
integration (Perry 1989).
Vertical integration may arise in a number of ways.
Vertical formation describes vertical integration which
occurs at the time the firm is created. Vertical
expansion describes vertical integration which occurs as
a result of internal growth of the firm creating its own
subsidiaries of the neighboring stages. Vertical merger
describes vertical integration which occurs through the
acquisition of one firm by the existing firm in a
neighboring stage.
iv. Farmer Cooperatives: An agricultural
cooperative is an organization usually incorporated,
owned, and controlled by agricultural producers, which
operates for the mutual benefit of its members as
producers or patrons (Rehber 1984). One world-wide
way of vertical coordination is of course cooperative
organization. Organizing under an agricultural
cooperative or producers’ group is also a type of
ownership integration. By working together in their
cooperatives, farmer-members can better control their
destiny (Ling and Liebrant 1995).
The consequences of farmers’ participation in the
cooperatives would provide them easily access to
available markets, enhanced net returns and
countervailing power when facing anti-competitive
market forces (Petraglia and Rogers 1991). On the other
hand, the possible existence of a competitive yardstick
effect for cooperatives has long been considered
(Cotterill 1987). In cooperative structure, because of the
fact that producers as the supplier of the raw materials
are also the owners of the processing units, it can be
thought that the relationship between the farmers and
processors do not create problems any more. But it is not
a correct approach. In practice this type of coordination
could also be the cause of problems and disputes
especially when the alternative marketing opportunities
are available. To avoid such problems in cooperatives,
contractual relationship with members farmers is
advisable (Royer 1995).
Farmers can also be organized under bargaining
cooperatives to have power at the bargaining table when
setting the terms of contractual relationships. Managing
supply and controlling nonmember free riders are
considered the main problems of such organizations
(Iskow and Sexton 1992). Despite these problems, they
have been a balancing power and a beneficial force in
improving the degree of competition in the many of the
agricultural commodities markets (Cramer et al. 1997)Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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2.2. Theories of the Vertical Coordination
The food system from farm to the consumer table
has been traditionally operated in an open market system
relaying on the price signals. However, considerable
close cooperation-coordination has been observed in
food systems as they move from arm’s-length or open
market transaction toward pure vertical integration.
There are several theories that are used to study
vertical coordination and no conclusive theory yet
exists(Azzam and Pagaulatos 1999). Each theory focuses
on different aspects, applies different explanation
mechanisms and reaches different outcomes and
managerial implications.
Traditional microeconomic theory provides limited
help because it assumes open markets and independent
firms react to determined market prices. Concepts of
industrial organization are only partially helpful in that
they assist in understanding the relationships between
structure and performance but do little to explain
dynamics of firm behavior and interactions between or
amongst firms. Behavioral science may provide rather
comprehensive framework to study vertical coordination
involving the theories of transaction cost and principal-
agent, strategic management, negotiating power, and
performance incentives.
Some of the more reliable considerations on theory
of vertical coordination, in general, are summarized
below. The issues of vertical coordination and contract
farming can be easily understood and analyzed in the
light of a combination of different and sometimes
overlapping approaches and understandings of these
theories. In other words, the theories presented here
reflect different facets of the vertical coordination and
can be thought of as complementary.
2.2.1. Theory of Life Cycle
Stigler’s life-cycle theory of vertical integration was
based on Adam Smith’s theorem: “the division of labor
is limited by the extent of market.” Life-cycle theory
shows that an industry is more vertically integrated in its
early stage of development. When the industry is small,
it does not pay for a firm to specialize in an activity that
yield increasing return to scale. As the industry grows,
some existing or incoming firms may specialize in one
of the processes. That is, as the industry expands, it
becomes profitable for a firm to specialize. Thus, in this
second stage, a disintegration occurs. During the third
stage, as the markets shrinks, firms tend to reintegrate
and undertake more processes than in the first stage.
Stigler’s life cycle approach has been criticized but also
extended to explain the evolution of agricultural
industries (Berkama and Drabenstott1995; Gillespie et
al. 1997).
2.2.2. Transaction Cost and Principal-Agent Theory
The history of transaction cost economics starts with
Coase’s famous article in 1937 explaining why firm
exists (Coase 1988). Coase argued the existence of costs
of using the price mechanism. These costs later termed
transaction costs, included the costs of writing,
executing, and enforcing contracts. Firms are established
to minimize these transaction costs of exchange. If it is
more expensive for a firm to acquire an input in the
market place than to produce it itself, the firm will
vertically integrate into production of the input. After
Coase’s study, the literature on transaction cost approach
to vertical coordination did not substantially develop
until the late 1970s (Barry et al. 1992). Williamson
expanded Coase’s idea of transaction cost including
behavioral assumptions of opportunity
2 and bounded
rationality
3 of economic agents. This theory is based on
the idea that “institutions of economic organization have
a transaction cost origin“(Williamson 1973).
Williamson considered the main purpose of vertical
integration to be economizing of transaction costs. He
identified two types of transaction costs; Ex-ante and ex-
post. Ex ante costs include the cost of drafting,
negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement. Ex- post
costs are those costs incurred when agreements become
a source of disputes.
In each case these costs may include the cost of
acquiring and processing information, legal costs,
organization costs and costs of inefficient pricing and
production behavior (Joskow 1990). The concept of
transaction cost and principal-agent theory as conceived
by Coase and expanded by Williamson and others
indicates that the form of vertical linkages or
coordination in an economic system depends not only on
economies of size and scope as suggested by
conventional theory but also on costs incurred in
completing transactions using various coordination
mechanisms.
Furthermore, these costs and the performance of
various coordination mechanism depend in part on the
incentives and relationship between transacting parties in
the system, the principal and the agent. Under various
conditions, the principle and/or agent may exhibit
                                                       
2 Opportunism is the wayward tendencies of supplier to
mislead, cheat and generally underperform. An integrated firm
minimizes these hazards by owning and directly controlling its
own suppliers.
3 Bounded rationality is the limits of reducing transaction
costs. By owning and directly controlling their own
operations, an integrator firm can avoid the cost of searching
for the best and the cheapest suppliers.Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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shirking behavior or moral hazard behavior
4 (Boehlje
and Schrader 1998).
Transaction costs can be separated into two
categories: coordination and motivation costs (Milgrom
and Roberts 1992).
i. Coordinating costs are the costs of monitoring
the environment, planning and bargaining to decide what
needs to be done (pre-contractual costs; ex-ante).
ii. Motivation costs are the cost of measuring
performance, providing incentives, and enforcing
agreements to ensure that people follow instructions,
honor commitments, and keep agreements (post-
contractual costs; ex-post)
In transaction cost theory, each type of vertical
governance structure will stem from the characteristic of
transactions. Under the assumption of economic
efficiency and competition, the chosen governance
structure will minimize total transaction costs (Sauvee
1998).
Agency theory deals with the relationship between
two parties. In an agency relationship, the agent (e.g., the
farmer) is expected to behave in accordance with the
goals of the principles (e.g., lenders, wholesalers,
processors).
The theory focuses on the contract between these
two parties and seeks to determine the optimal contract,
i.e., the contract with the most efficient organization of
information and the lowest cost.
Agency theory suggests two main strategies of
control, behavior based and outcome based (Eisenhardt
1985). When the behavior of the agent is observed, a
behavior-based contract is optimal. In the case of
complete information the agent is aware of his/her
behavior, but the principal is not. In the case of
incomplete information, if the agent is rewarded based
upon his/her behavior, the agent may shirk. In both these
cases, the principal has two options; either the principle
can purchase information about the behavior of the agent
and rewards good behavior or the principal can reward
the agent based on outcomes. The optimal choice occurs
between the two alternatives based on the trade-off
between the cost of measuring behavior and the cost of
measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent
(Eisenhardt 1985).
In an agency relationship, because of the different
reasons such as information asymmetries, it is
impossible to write a complete and comprehensive
contract to cover all possible future events. Therefore,
contracts generally are incomplete and the objectives and
                                                       
4 The possibility of self-interested misbehavior before and/or
after agreement (pre- and/or post negotiation.
activities of the principal and agent will not completely
coincide (Barry et al. 1992).
The set of institutional arrangements within a
transaction is called a governance structure. Mohaney
(1992) recognizes a continuum of governance structures
including spot markets, short term contracts, franchising,
joint ventures, and vertical financial ownership.
Mohaney suggests that the form of coordination or
business linkages will be a function of three
characteristics of the transactions and the industry :
i. Asset specificity refers to the specialized nature
of the human or physical assets that are required to
complete the transaction. The more idiosyncratic the
asset, the stronger the linkage or bound required for the
transacting parties to invest in that asset.
ii. Task programmability: Indicates that a
transaction is well understood by all parties and often
repeated, thus not requiring intense discussions or
negotiations and easily accomplished by impersonal
coordination mechanisms.
iii. Task separability: Refers to the ability to
determine and measure the value of the contribution and
thus the reward that should be given to each participant
in the transaction. If it can be accomplished easily (and
thus transaction is separable), coordination systems that
are less personal are relatively more efficient and
effective than separability does not exist.
Transactions have been classified in terms of
frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity
5. The
transaction cost approach provide insight into the key
role of asset specificity but neglects the interactive effect
of the measurement problems that have been highlighted
by the agency theory.
On the other hand, positive agency theory
emphasizes measurement costs but neglects asset
specificity (Mahoney 1992). The integration of the
transaction costs and agency approaches yields five
determinants of organizational form: task
programmability, task separability, demand uncertainty,
                                                       
5 Williamson (1989, p.143) identifies four different types of
transaction specific investment; i. Site specificity: Buyer and
seller are in a relation with one another, reflecting ex ante
decisions to minimize inventory and transportation expense. ii.
Physical asset specificity: When one or both parties make
investments in equipment and machinery that involves design
characteristic specific to the transaction and which have lower
values in alternative uses. iii. Human-capital specificity:
Arising as a consequence of learning-by doing, investment and
transfer skills (specific human capital). iv. Dedicated assets:
General investments that would not take place but for the
prospects of selling a significant amount of products to a
particular customer. If the contract is terminated, it would
leave the supplier with significant excess capacity.Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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technological uncertainty and asset specificity. Mahoney
(1992) presented an organizational form prediction
considering the interactive effects of the task
programmability, task separability and transaction cost
of asset specificity (Table2.1).
Despite the general acceptance, transaction cost
economics is also heavily criticized. The importance of
transaction costs seems to be over emphasized. Indeed,
transaction costs are important but they are not
everything (Boon 1999). In short, vertical integration is a
form of governance structure and can lead to lower
transaction costs.
McFetridge (1994) suggested another theory called
imperfect competition or neoclassical approach as a
complementary approach to the transaction costs theory.
The imperfect competition approach to vertical
integration is concerned with the opportunities for
vertical exchange that arise as a consequence of
imperfect competition at one or more stages of
production.
He argued that, theoretically, imperfect competition
at one or more stages of production makes either vertical
restraints or vertical integration profitable. “ One well
known example is the successive monopoly or
successive marginalization problem. The replacement of
successive monopolies by a vertically integrated
monopoly is both profitable and welfare increasing”
(McFetridge 1994).
2.2.3. Strategic Management.
This concept is derived from Porter’s value chain
strategies to develop a strategic competitive advantage
and the criteria or considerations in the integration (buy-
versus-build) decision. According to Porter, the basic
unit of competitive advantage is the discrete activities.
The firm is a collection of discrete but interrelated
activities and firm’s strategy defines how they are
interrelated. Hence, competitive advantage will result
“from a firm’s ability to perform the required activities
at a collectively lower cost than rivals.” The central
interest of Porter’s approach is that vertical coordination
is a result of a firm’s behavior. Boone and Verbeke
(1991), in their analysis used a “strategic management of
contractual relations” concept wherein the benefit is
normally associated with a hierarchical organization. For
them, vertical coordination can be explained in terms of
transaction costs (Sauvee 1998).
Harrigan (1986) explained the dimensions of vertical
integration as degree, stage, breadth, and form and tried
to measure them. She took a classical strategic
management perspective on vertical integration and
outlined four main factors that determine the choice of
vertical integration. These factors are demand and
infrastructure uncertainties, market stability, bargaining
power and corporate strategy requirements (Harrigan
1986).
A transaction can be organized within the firm or
through the market, but organizing a transaction within
the firm does not eliminate contracting costs, since by
doing so one replaces a contract for intermediate input
with employment contracts. Choosing the appropriate
mix of contracts and improving the efficiency of each
type is a source of competitive advantage (Hernart
1994). In other words, competitive advantage arises
from inter-firm differences in their organization
capacities and also taking into consideration bureaucratic
costs and the incentive problem of hierarchy. Hennart
(1994) extended the definition of transaction costs
stating that while economizing on transaction costs,
vertical integration may increase the bureaucratic costs.
He argued that using an appropriate coordination
strategy is important within the firm and on the market.
Zajac and Olsen (1993) have indicated that the
standard transaction cost theory is a one-sided analysis
of cost minimization and neglects the interdependence
between partners. They attempted to provide a new
perspective on transaction cost analysis by offering a
transactional analysis framework based on joint value
maximization instead of a single-party analysis of cost
minimization and by proposing a set of processual
dimensions relevant to create and claim value by
partners. They did not claim that transaction costs do not
exist or are irrelevant to the study of inter-organizational
strategies. According to Zajac and Olsen, process/
behavioral aspects of inter-organizational must be
considered (Zajac and Olsen 1993).
From the strategic management point of view, the
incomplete character of transaction cost analysis leads to
overestimation of advantages of vertical integration.
Both market transactions and vertical integration are
inefficient. Therefore, the main challenge of the firm is
to develop strategic management of the contractual
arrangement.
2.2.4. Negotiating Power and Performance Incentives.
Another set of arguments that may help explain the
choice and implementation of various coordination
mechanisms relates to the concept of negotiation power
and performance incentives. In negotiated coordination
among stages in the food chain, the invisible hand of the
market is replaced by the very visible hands of buyers
and sellers negotiating the terms of trade in many cases
prior to the production or manufacturing process. In such
a system, phenomena such as negotiating strategy, skill,
power, conflict resolution, trust, performance
monitoring, and evaluation become central in theVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report #52 8
system. Recent work on various approaches to provide
performance incentives, as proposed by Casson, may
also be useful (Boehlje and Schrader 1998). The basic
presumption of the Casson’s work is that the overall
economic performance of any system depends on
transaction costs which mainly reflect the level of trust
that exists in the economy. The level of trust in turn
depends upon culture. A key concept in this argument is
that of trust. A crucial question in any economic
transaction, and particularly in those that personnel and
negotiated, is whether either party in the transaction can
be trusted. There are two fundamental approaches to
creating trust;
i. Use of the legal system and penalize those
parties that do not fulfill their negotiated commitments.
ii. Manipulating an intensive structure that
individuals fulfill their commitments based on rewards
they receive rather than penalties they incur.
The impossibility of writing a complete contract and
asset specificity associated with modern agricultural
production strengthen the role of trust in contract
coordination. In a continuing game even the large
contractor who is recognized as being in control must
maintain a reputation for fairness. The contractor needs a
group of contractees as much as the contractees need the
contractor.
Another interesting approach to vertical coordination
is Sporleder’s interpretation of strategic alliances based
on collaboration and the trust as the key features.
Sporleder (1994), in his definition of strategic alliances,
excludes merger and acquisition and other corporate
partnering, and includes only informal vertical
arrangement. In this type of coordination, parties to the
alliance are stakeholders in the object of cooperation but
they are not shareholders. The arrangement is self-
enforcing i.e. in the event of breach of contract, the
arrangement is simply terminated, third party
involvement is not anticipated. The length of this type of
alliance is long-term compared to other classical one-
season or one-year contracts.
2.2.5. The Capabilities Approach
Knowledge-based capabilities was used first by
Richardson linking capabilities with the pattern of
economic organization. He suggested that in an industry
there are an indefinitely large number of activities. These
activities have to be carried out by organizations with
appropriate capabilities i.e. with appropriate knowledge,
experience and skills (Richardson 1972). He discussed
that, coordination among the firms could be
accomplished by consolidation, co-operation and market
transaction. The appropriate way of coordination depend
on the degree of similarity, complementarity between or
among activities.
In the capabilities view, knowledge has a central
explanatory role for understanding economic
organization. Contrary to neoclassical theory, the
capabilities approach assumes that knowledge about
production is neither explicit or freely transferable.
Under full information and no uncertainty, every
organization is as efficient as any other. However, much
of the knowledge is tacit and hard to formalize and
communicate and can be acquired only through learning
processes (Boon 1999). Each firm processes capabilities
differently than other firms and thus, will not incur the
same production costs even though they perform the
same type of productive activity (Foss 1996).
Asymmetries in knowledge: i.e. differential
capabilities result in performance differences between
firms. Knowledge could be transferred through the
market mechanism or through firm organization.
Transfer of tacit knowledge is impossible, only codified
knowledge or explicit knowledge in products can be
transferred across markets. Economic agents may have
substantial differences in initial productive knowledge
for their joint productivity. In that sense, frictions can
occur between economic agents. These frictions are also
called knowledge based transaction costs (Connor and
Prahaland 1996). Integration into many stages would be
costly because other economic agents with superior
capabilities would have a relative production cost
advantage. Hence, firms must rely on market
transactions or cooperation between firms, even when
transaction cost economics would suggest otherwise.
Boon (1999) discussed what determines the choice of
organizational structure in the food system and why the
food system is more tightly integrated. He explained the
capabilities approach using an example in livestock
raising and argued that farrowing, nursery, and finishing
are integrated within the farm firm while slaughtering,
carcass cutting, and processing are integrated in
slaughterhouses. However, farm activities are not similar
to slaughterhouse activities in that they draw on very
different capabilities. Transactions between farms and
slaughterhouses were often market transactions, but
contracting has become more dominant in the animal
production sector. Slaughterhouses produce increasingly
different products with specific quality characteristics
included branded products instead of generic. In order to
establish this production, slaughterhouses need to
developed and transfer the necessary knowledge to the
supplier. This knowledge may be tacit and hence
difficult to be acquired by the farmers. Contracts that
specify particular quality characteristics or even the
specification of production techniques may be an
attempt to codify this knowledge in order to create newVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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value in the production process. For example, pig
farming has usually been integrated within one farm, but
farmers are increasingly specializing in only farrowing,
nursery or finishing. Boon (1999) concluded that
differential capabilities give them a production cost
advantage which may outweigh transaction cost (Boon
1999).
2.2.6. Convention Theory and Contract Economics.
These are the recent theoretical developments
relevant for the study of vertical coordination.
 Prices do not constitute a determining variable to
ensure coordination but one of the links of organization
subject to conventional rule. When open market works
properly, quality will be assessed by a given price. But
quality conventions are necessary when the price alone
can not evaluate quality. Eymard-Duvernay
distinguishes four generic forms of coordination (Sauvee
1999). Domestic coordination occurs when uncertainty
about quality is solved through trust. In industrial
coordination, quality is defined by a third party, outside
the market, who determines the common norm and
standards. If prices are sufficient indicators to evaluate
quality, i.e. if there is no uncertainty about quality, then
the market works by itself which is called market
coordination. Civic coordination occurs when there is
a collective commitment to avoid conflicts. In this
theory, a set of mechanisms and rules that involve
private agents as well as public institution exist. The
content of product specification, nature and roles of third
parties involved, strategy of product differentiation or
labeling, or other empirical observations about quality
clarify the convention. Influenced by strategic
management approaches, convention theorist insist that
coordination mechanisms determine the degree of
cooperation or competition between agents. Moreover,
the convention theory approach shows that the definition
of contracts cannot be understood exclusively at the
microeconomic level, i.e. between two partners. A
convention is also a mode of regulation found at a
collective level, for instance a region or an industry.
Unlike the neoclassic economist, convention theorists do
not consider non-price exchange between firms as
market failure or imperfections. Instead, adopting a
positive approach, they integrate the diversity and the
complexity of the quality issue and build their analysis
on it. In spite of methodological incompleteness, this
approach usefully links quality questions with industrial
structure. Convention theory has been used in the study
of quality conventions found in agricultural sub-sectors.
Valceschini demonstrates that in the French vegetable
processing industry, the traditional articulation between
civic and industrial coordination where price discovery
and definition of quality are centralized is no longer
relevant. In this sector, product contracts between
vegetable producers and processors have been
established at a collective level in a national inter-
professional organization (Valceschini 1995). Sylvander
(1995) demonstrates that in the French poultry
processing industry, quality specifications influence the
choice of coordination mechanisms and consequently,
the firms compete and cooperate. This is the emergence
and the strengthening of an industrial convention that
determines the economic behavior of the firms. In this
industrial convention, quality is defined and controlled
by the third party. Each grower is held to a strict set of
standards and requirements about feed, genetic stocks,
housing conditions, etc. Based on the convention theory
assumptions, Valceschini’s and Sylvander’s approaches
have three methodological steps for the study of vertical
coordination.
i. The comprehensiveness of the contract’s
formation can not be understood exclusively at the
microeconomic level. Indeed the content of the
contractual arrangements (micro level) may stem from
institutional arrangements and institutional organizations
(macro level).
ii. These institutional arrangements greatly
contribute to the shape of the competition in the sector.
Contract are not outside the competitive process but are
a part of it.
iii. The formation of these arrangements is itself
dependant upon external and internal factors. Therefore,
a complete vertical coordination analysis should include
the study of interplay between basic conditions and
strategic behaviors and the effect of their consequences
on the institutional environment (Sauvee 1998).
Brousseau’s (1993) contract economics extends the
Williamsonian paradigm but reconsiders some of his
fundamental assumptions. He proposes a general theory
of bilateral economic relations and combines transaction
cost theory and elements of industrial organization.
Although strongly influenced by Williamson, Brousseau
differs from him on several important matters. His
definition of costs is more extensive adding two more
cost categories to the transaction costs: production and
incentive costs. These three categories of costs are the
basic elements for the evaluation of contract efficiency.
He focuses on the comprehension of the decision process
instead of defining a determinist model of governance
structure. For him a redefined notion of contracts
replaces the governance structure (Sauvee 1998).
2.2.7. Value Differentiation and Complementarities.
Goodhau and Rauser tried to explain recent
organizational changes in the food system by using theVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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theory of complementarities. They have defined recent
changes in the agro-food system as value differentiation
instead of industrialization (Goodhau and Rausser 1999).
Value differentiation describes the process by which
increasing the value added to agricultural products by
differentiating them to meet consumer requirements. The
theory of complementarities in activities was first
written by Milgrom and Roberts (1992). Essentially, the
theory of complementarities formalizes the notion of
positive feedback effects among a firm’s production,
organization and management choices. A shift in an
exogenous system parameter will have direct effects on
the firm’s activity choices, reinforced by the feedback
effects across activities. Biotechnology, information
technology, and changes in consumer preferences which
are commonly viewed as the driving forces of value
differentiation are not induced by actions of the actors of
agro-food chain but rather are due to changes in the
lifestyles, incomes, and demographics. The value of
differentiation process is driven by complementarities
across activities so that a jump in one variable, such as a
biotechnology-induced change in the production, will
change the marginal value of other activities. This
structure aids firms in identifying desired products and
delivering these products to consumer at the lowest cost.
2.3. Contract Farming
2.3.1. The Concept of Contract Farming
These sort of vertically coordinated production
relations are not new. Contracts were employed by the
Japanese colonial state for sugar production in Taiwan in
the period after 1885 and by the USA banana companies
in central America in the early part of the twentieth
century (Watts 1994). By the late twentieth century,
however, in the Western Europe
6, North America and
Japan, contract farming became an integral part of food
and fiber industry. In advanced capitalist states, it seems
that contract farming was widely used by the vegetable
canning industry in North America and by the seed
industry in the Western Europe in the 1930s and 1940s.
Contracts in a general and incomplete sense are
found in agriculture everywhere in extremely
heterogeneous forms. Simple market specification
contracts or future purchase agreements (typically
determine price, quantity, and time of delivery) are
common and labor contracting, supplying labor and
machinery as well as share-cropping contracts have a
wide application in agriculture (Wright 1989; Eswaran
and Kotwal 1985).
Contract farming or contract production, however,
                                                       
6 Earliest record of forward purchase agreement is dated 1878
(Barker 1972).
must be distinguished from the multiplicity of simple
marketing or share-cropping and labor contracts.
Specifically, contract farming entails relations between
growers and private or state enterprises, that substitute
for spot market transactions between family farms and a
processing, export or purchasing unit. A standard
farming contract includes provisions for price,
production practices, product quality, and credit
facilities, etc.
Arriving at a meaningful definition of contract
farming is rather difficult. The one classic definition
provided by Roy refers to contractual arrangement
between farmers and other firms, whether oral or
written, specifying one or more conditions of production
and/or marketing of an agricultural product (Roy 1963).
Roy's definition is perhaps too broad since it would
include forward contract in which only price and volume
are set. Whether a forward contract can be bought and
sold is not our interest here. In the definition above, even
after excluding marketing arrangements such as forward
contracts, two conditions must be added.
First, contracts should be non-transferable, and
second, the terms "and/or" should be replaced by "and".
Contracts must specify one or more conditions of
production and marketing (Glover 1984).
Contract farming has been promoted over the past 30
years as an institutional innovation to improve
agricultural performance in less developed countries
sometimes as a key element of rural development and/or
settlement projects (Ghee and Dorall 1992).
This system was accepted and used as one of the
promising institutional frameworks for the delivery of
price incentives, technology, and other agricultural
inputs. Local governments, private firms, multinational
companies, international aid and lending agencies like U.S.
Agency for International Development, The World Bank,
Asian Development Bank, and Commonwealth Development
Corporation have been involved in these contract farming
arrangements (Glover 1994). However, world-wide
applications in practice has caused to appear different
terms and connotations regarding contract farming in
related literature (Glover 1992). Hence, contract
farming is used only for a private sector scheme, while
other terms are used for different applications as follows.
Outgrower Scheme: Generally connotes a
government scheme. In this system government usually
has a public enterprise purchasing produce from farmers
on its own or as a part of joint venture with a private
firm. This term is frequently used in Africa and Asia.
Nucleus-Outgrower Scheme: It is a variation of the
outgrower scheme in which there is a project authority
which has or administers a plantation adjacent to the
processing plant. This plant supplements its ownVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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plantation production by contracting in different
proportions. Satellite farming is used to refer to any of
the variations of the schemes mentioned above. On the
other hand, the term of multipartite arrangement is
used to emphasize the scheme in which several actors
such as private firms, government, and foreign aid
agencies are involved.
Several types of contracts are distinguished
according to the number of decisions influenced, sharing
of the risks, and specifying contract terms. From the
production decisions or management point of view, two
types of contracts are determined.
i. Limited Management Contracts: In this type,
the farmer signs a contract to obtain some production
inputs. There is no real guarantee for price. The farmer’s
responsibility is limited only for the production inputs
which he has obtained under agreement.
ii. Full Management Contracts: In this case the
farmer and the integrator firm have made a contract
based on a certain amount of production. In this type of
contract the farmer has to follow some provisions
specified in the agreement. Here, the producer provides a
certain market for his product and insures himself
against risks.
Kohls and Uhl (1985) has classified contracts into
three broad categories.
 i. Market specification contracts: Specify product
quality measures which will be acceptable to the
integrator and restrictions placed regarding the price and
the method of payment. Contracts are generally signed at
planting time and specify how much the integrator will
buy and at what price. Little or none of the farmer's
management decisions are transferred. From the
producer viewpoint, they guarantee a buyer if the
specifications are met.
ii. Resource providing contracts: In this type, the
integrators provide production resources with certain
conditions, managerial help, and supervision. Product
prices are usually based upon the spot markets and
income guarantees to the producers are minimal.
iii. Management and income guaranteeing
contracts: These types of contracts often include the
production and marketing stipulations of the former two
types. In addition, market and price risks are transferred
from farmers to integrators. On the other hand the
integrator takes a substantial part of the managerial
responsibility of the farmers.
Another contract classification identified by
Williamson (1979) based on the transaction economies.
These are, classical, neoclassical and relational
contracting. According to Williamson (1979) three
characteristics of transactions are important in the
determination of the contractual relationship,
uncertainty, frequency of transactions, and the degree to
which investments are idiosyncratic. He described
different governance structures regarding the
characteristics of transactions, excluding uncertainty, as
shown in Table 2.2.
Classical Contracting (Market Governance):
Market governance is the main governance structure for
nonspecific investment characteristic of both occasional
and recurrent transactions. This type of contract is rather
definitive. They are complete and might be traded on the
exchange. In these contracts, third party participation is
discouraged. The emphasis is on legal rules, formal
documents, and self liquidating. Contracts for delivery
of a specific quantity at a specific price, time and place
are considered a part of market consideration (Schrader
1986).
Relational Contracting (Transaction-specific
Governance): This type of structure is used for
recurring, mixed, and highly idiosyncratic transactions
of. In this relational contraction, two main types of
governance structure can be observed. Bilateral
structure (obligational contracting) refers to autonomy
of the parties.
Vertical integration refers to the unified structures
where the transactions are removed from the market and
organized within the firm subject to an authority
relation. When the contractors guarantee is needed to
finance producers facility, production is controlled by
the contractors and the contract is long-term, there would
be significant differences between contracting and
integration.
In the bilateral structure, mixed and idiosyncratic
characters of investment required for production are
extensively specialized so there are no obvious scale
economies to be realized through inter-firm trading that
the contractor or contractee is enable to realize himself
through vertical integration.
Under uncertainty, of course the degree of
uncertainty would affect the degree of integration
depending on the asset specificity and frequency of
transaction.
2.3.2. Reasons for Contract Farming and Disadvantages.
The main reasons behind contract farming could be
summarized as follows:
From the transaction cost framework, the neoclassic
focus on market imperfections is limited because it
ignores the cost of exchanges, i.e. transaction costs. The
main reason for the vertical integration is to decrease
these transaction costs. The degree of integration mainly
depends on the frequency, asset specificity, and
uncertainty regarding transactions. Asset specificity
encourages internal coordination. Large investment inVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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specialized assets increase the potential loss under
unexpected market outcomes. Thus, uncertainty (price,
quantity, quality and time) is an important factor
favoring internal coordination along with the availability
of asset specificity.
Market imperfection that may produce incentives for
vertical integration include imperfect competition in
addition to imperfections caused by externalities and
imperfect or asymmetric information (Rogers 1998).
Uncertainty and reducing risk have significant
coordination implications. One of the main risks is that
of prices of inputs and outputs. Coordination through
contracting or integration will reduce price risk to some
extent. A second source of risk is related to quantity and
quality features. In a open market structure, it is almost
impossible to provide the required quantity of
commodity in a certain quality. A third source of risk is
food safety issues that can be analyzed into two
dimensions. The risks for human life and for
environment pollution. Both require rather personal and
coordinated market relationships.
Another main important force behind the integration
and contract farming is the changes in the market
structure. Well-trained buyers in the market and the
necessity to supply produce with a certain quality and
quantity over time are the main reasons. Consumers
have become more discriminating food buyers. Increased
demand of prepared food and concerns about nutrition
and food safety are the important determinants for
strengthening vertical coordination (Berkama and
Drabenstoll 1995). Delivering food products with
improved safety characteristics requires coordination
among producers, first handlers, processors, and retailers
(Caswell et al. 1994). The primary motivation for such
arrangements is to obtain greater control over the
physical characteristics and quantities of commodities
exchanged (Buccola and French 1981).
It is a fact that production technologies have been
improving very rapidly. Market failure in conveying
information about quality is one of the motives for
increased vertical coordination (Hennessy, 1996).
Contract farming is seen as a sound way to push
innovation of new technologies and provide more
efficient production.
The establishment of a new processing plant requires
large investment resulting in high fixed costs. An uneven
supply of raw material greatly increases unit costs.
Therefore these firms have an interest in keeping raw
material inflows at a steady level close to plant capacity
(Roy 1963; Harryman 1994). Relying on open market
purchases is unlikely achieve this steady raw material
flow.
Contract farming is also thought of as a way of
commercialization and industrialization in agriculture
especially for the developing and less developed
countries. Contract farming will help small family farms
and farm laborers who need capital and managerial
assistance (Moore 1994). The majority of the farms are
small and subsistence. In nature, it is commonly
recognized that small family farms are potentially an
important source of growth in agricultural production
and small scaled agriculture has some socio-economic
advantages (Rehber 1996). But there are serious
constraints on small farm production related to problems
of access to production inputs, services, and information.
Small farmers often lack the necessary production and
marketing information pertaining to new crops and
varieties. Even with sufficient information, they do not
have the financial resources necessary and access to
credit facilities are limited mainly because of the lack of
collateral. Contract farming is an example of such a
mechanism that deals with many of these constraints in
an integrated manner (Roy 1963 ; Doye et al. 1992).
Government intervention and subsidization policy could
be seen as an alternative to contract farming. Public
interventions and support policies are ineffective
especially in the developing countries and they do not
help to remove the obstacles mentioned above.
Government efforts to subsidize are mostly in favor of
large farmers. “The New World Order“ of global
restructuring of the food industry symbolized by the
GATT and newly established WTO which are mainly
aiming at lessening or cutting agricultural subsidies must
be considered here.
One of the main reasons for the integrators may be
to avoid government restrictions (Shepperd 1990).
Internal transfer of intermediate input and flexibility of
adjusting production cost through internalization can be
used as a way reducing tax. Internal exchange is a means
of avoiding control when the intermediate input is
subject to price controls.
Beside the reasons mentioned above, recent
sophisticated ideas such as environmentally sound,
sustainable and economically viable agriculture and
standards and regulation related to both environment and
health safety are the main initiatives behind the fast
growing use of vertical coordination and contractual
arrangements in agriculture (Boehlje et al.1995)
Although the reasons for change from open
production and market exchange to all types of vertical
relationships are essentially similar, some inherent
characteristics of agricultural production and marketing
dominate contractual relationships in agriculture.
Despite the changes toward a market oriented structure,
the rapid decline in numbers and growth in sizes
especially in the developed western world, historicallyVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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large number of individual farm units and spatial
dimension of the agriculture which consists of scattered
firms structure over a large area have been the major
factors for the dominance of long and short-term
production contracts (Olson 1985).
Other main distinctive characteristics of agricultural
products and markets could be identified as follows:
• Agricultural products are often bulky and/or
perishable, causing shipping cost to be high, restricting
mobility and limiting access to only those buyers located
close to the production site,
• Processors need highly specialized agricultural
products and other inputs can not normally be
substituted for a given agricultural product.
• Farmers are specialized to the supply of particular
commodities through extensive investment in sunk
assets. This represents exit barriers for farmers and cause
the raw product supply to be inelastic (Rogers and
Sexton ,1994 p. 1143)
Along with a variety of related problems such as
delays in delivery or payment, quality deterioration, etc.,
contract farming generally also has some disadvantages
or problems as a production system. One of the
economic factors favoring the increasing use of
production contracts is the need to realize efficiencies
through risk management, but contract farming creates
its own risk, as well as reducing other risks. For the
producer, the failure of producing to contract standards
will result in loss of the contract’s premium prices. Other
risks include the non-renewal or termination of
contracts, perhaps for non-economic reasons. On the
processor side, the main risks are the failure to have a
constant supply, or losing timely receipt of desired
quality and quantity of product, loss of technological
advantage, and liability to the producers or third parties
(Kelley 1994).
The farmer loses his independence to some extent
contingent on contract conditions. That means the
farmer's management function is transferred to another
person. It is arguable that, a skilled farmer get worse
under a contract than if he takes his chance in an open
market.
It is a fact that contracting is a negotiation between
unequal, economically powerful agro-business and
rather weaker farmers. But farmers can cooperate to gain
bargaining power to ensure fair contract terms.
Finally, if the integrator has gained a monopsony
position, he could abuse his position to violate contract
provisions in his favor. That means when alternative
marketing opportunities are closed out and an overly
integrated firm or sector may beat down the terms of the
contract. Of course this is not a desirable consequence
for improving agricultural marketing.
2.3.4. Content of Contract
A fair contract should contain reciprocal obligations
with a balance between the rewards and the risks
accruing to each party. A production contract should at
least contain the provisions presented below:
• Define the parties.
• Specify type and the quality of the produce.
• State the quantity of the produce.
• State clearly the responsibilities of both parties
concerning production and marketing practices.
• Indicate the manner, including timing , of delivery or
collection.
• Determine the price (specific or formula) or other
consideration and indicate the effects of variations in
quality, quantity or manner of delivery and also specify
the manner and timing of payment. Price is frequently
left variable in contracts. Fixed or negotiated prices are
more frequently used in one to three year contracts. If
the majority of transactions in a commodity are priced
through such negotiations, the fixed price becomes the
market price. Sometimes contract prices are established
by a scale or formula that relates the contract price to
various economic indicators (Buccola and French 1981).
• Indicate the duration of the contract and the way in
which it may be terminated and/or renewed. Contracts
for processing vegetables and field crops are mostly
signed on an annual basis. Fruit contracts tend to span
more than one year (Buccola 1980).
• Appoint an arbitrator or indicate how disputes are to
be resolved.
• Signature clause.
3. General Structure of Food Industry and Contract
Farming in Turkey and in the USA
3.1.General Structure of Food Industry and Contract
Farming in Turkey
3.1.1. General Overview
Since the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923
Turkey has been a country in transition from an
agricultural economy to an industrial economy.
Although considerable progress has been achieved,
fundamental problems still exist in agriculture and in the
food sector when compared to developed countries. The
share of agriculture in national income and export value
have been decreasing and were 13.37%
7 and 11.45%
respectively in 1996
 (Anonymous 1998). Shares of rural
population and active labor force employed in
agriculture were about 35% and 45% respectively in
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1995 (Anonymous, 1995). One of the main obstacles of
the Turkish Agriculture, and of course general
development efforts, is the rather high ratio of
population engaged in agriculture that live in rural areas.
Turkey has 779,000 sq. km total area, one-twelfth that of
the U.S. There are approximately 4 million farms,
increasing from 3.1 million in 1960. The farm structure
in Turkey is very fragmented. In 1991, 66.9% of farm
households were cultivating an area smaller than 5 ha.
More than 95% of all farms and over 60% of the total
land fell into the less than 20 ha farm size group. There
are about 37 State Farms which have an average of more
than 1000 ha. Most of these operate under the control of
Ministry of Agriculture (General Directorate of State
Farms). Although subject to privatization in the recent
two decades, they played an important role in the early
development stage of Turkish agriculture through
introduction of high-yield seeds, new production
techniques, and application of contract farming.
Development of the Turkish food industry as in the
other sectors, was initiated with the foundation of the
Republic. The first sugar factory was established in 1926
(Hershlag 1958). Considerable progress has been
achieved through five-year plans and annual programs
which began in 1963.
This progress accelerated in the 1970s, with market-
oriented policies instead of inward-looking strategies.
Turkey embarked upon rather comprehensive
liberalization and structural adjustment programs
especially after 1980 (Uygur 1995).
Despite several incentives devoted to the sector in
the five-year development plans since 1960, food
industry has not reached the desired level in Turkey.
Although it is difficult to find reliable data, it could be
said that the share of food supplied through processing
10-20%, as compared to 60% in the developed world.
Growth rates ranging between 4% and 7% were
achieved during the planned period. There are rather
serious problems concerning the development of the
food industry. The most important, as defined by the
industry, is raw material procurement problem and
vertical co-ordination between farmers and industry.
There were 25,368 firms in the food industry
according to the 1990 Industry Census of Turkey up
from 22, 300 in 1988. Only 500 of them were higher
capacity factories which have modern technologies.
About 2,000 were lower capacity plants, the remainders
were small size units with undeveloped technologies
(Anonymous, 1993). Breakdown of firms by the number
of the employees is presented in Table 3.1. Of the total
25,368 firms, 53% were grain mills and bakeries. Dairy
and dairy products and fruit-vegetable processing plants
were the second and third having 17% and 16%
respectively.
The food industry share of the total employment in
manufacturing industry was 15% while 13% of total
value added of the manufacturing industry belonged to
the food-processing sector. The total established capacity
of the food processing plants is more than sufficient to
meet domestic and export demand, but some shortage
still exists because of the low capacity utilization in the
entire industry. It was estimated that only 31% of the
total production capacity was utilized in 1990 (Cetin et
al. 1996).
According the 1996 data, the manufacturing industry
share of total domestic GNP was 23.36%. Food
processing had the highest share of the manufacturing
sector income (Anonymous 1998). Total Turkish exports
were 23.167 billion dollars in 1996, 9.75% of which has
come from the food industry (2. 651 billion dollars).
Food industry imports were 1.7 billion dollars, 4% of the
total import value (Anonymous 1998).
Three different systems could be observed in
marketing of agricultural products. Some are marketed
in an organized system in which State Economic
Enterprises and Cooperative organizations exist.
Agricultural Sale Cooperatives have an important role in
the price supporting system. Commodity Exchanges
organized and controlled by law and regulations under
the control of Ministry of Commerce may be included in
this system. According to recent data, there are 98
Commodity Exchanges which are located in province
centers and some large districts. These are not very
effective (Doser and Rehber 1987).
Fresh fruit and vegetables are marketed in the
wholesale market system under the control of
municipalities. In this system, brokers and middleman
have an important role while the first system outlined
above is working in favor of producers.
The third group of agricultural products are
marketed in totally free-market.
These explanations are made only to give a picture
of the agricultural marketing structure of Turkey. It does
not mean that each product is sold in one of these three
systems. For example, if we consider milk marketing,
85% of the milk supply is handled and marketed in an
unorganized manner by farmers, middlemen and
approximately 2,800 small manufacturing plants. Only
15% of the total supply is handled by large capacity
plants which have modern technology. The number of
milk plants which have 1000 ton/year processing
capacity was 1,308 in 1992, 91.5% belong to the private
sector, 3.6% State Enterprises, and 4.9% cooperatives
(Anonymous 1995). Consequently it can be said that
most of agricultural products are handled in free-market
conditions.Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report #52 15
On a historical perspective, the Turkish food
industry has a triple structure. On the one side, State
Economic Enterprises (SEEs) had been established for
processing sugar-beets, meat, fish, and milk. Some of
these are subject to privatization and some plants have
already been privatized in the past decade. SEEs in
Turkey have taken a significant and a pioneer role in
food industry from the beginning of the Republic.
Especially the sugar industry since 1926 was not only
the real pioneer in development of Turkish industry; it
also was the initiator of contract farming. The Turkish
Dairy Industry had an important share in processing of
milk (some of them are privatized now). Most of sugar-
beet production and marketing are under the control of
the Turkish Sugar Factories Corporation. The Turkish
Tea Company, the Meat and Fish Organization, the
Turkish Fields Products Office and the State Monopolies
Directories are some of the other important SEEs in the
processing and marketing of related agricultural
products.
The second type of organization in the Turkish food
industry is cooperatives. The first agricultural sale
cooperative was established in 1911 to process figs.
According to the 1993 data, there were 433 Agricultural
Sale Cooperatives (ASC), 13 ASC Unions and 732,514
member farmers. Some of the large foods processing
plants still belong to these cooperative organizations.
The estimated shares of the Sale Cooperatives are dairy,
2.93%; olive oil, 6.8%; vegetable oil, 9.7%; fruit juice,
5%; and flour, 1% (Mulayim 1995). Beside these sale
cooperatives, Sugar-beet Producers Cooperatives, Tea
Producers Cooperatives, and Village Development
Cooperatives which have some food, processing and
handling plants must be considered. Agricultural Sale
Cooperatives have serious institutional, financial and
managerial problems (Mulayim 1997). They are
administered and controlled by the Ministry of
Commerce instead of their members. They are mainly
financed by State sources and have been acting as SEEs.
Therefore, the term privatization is used incorrectly for
these cooperative organizations (Rehber 1995).
However, from the main cooperative principles’ point of
view announced by the International Cooperative
Alliance, agricultural cooperatives in Turkey could not
be accepted as real cooperatives except Village
Development Cooperatives (Rehber 1993).
The third and most promising part of the food
industry is the private sector. It is expected that the
Turkish food industry will be developed in this structure
in the future through relatively large private corporations
which are viable in the changing and globalized market
conditions of the world.
Turkish agricultural policy is outlined in five year
Development Plans. The principles of agricultural policy
could be summarized as follows:
• Price support system.
• Agricultural extension services.
• Intervention to market both inputs and products
through Public Organizations, Cooperatives and SEE.
• Custom and credit facilities.
• Extension of irrigation.
The price support system was initiated in the 1930s
through intervention in wheat and grape markets by
purchasing in the market in order to regulate price. By
the end of 1970, the number of commodities in the price
support system had reached to 30. The economic
liberalization program embarked upon in early 1980s
has caused this figure to fall to 10 in 1990 and to 9 in
1996 (Muthoo and Onul 1996).
Turkey has taken part in almost all political,
economic and military movements of the West after
World War II. Turkey also signed an association
agreement with the EU in 1963. Despite it’s eligibility
underlined on several occasions, Turkey is still waiting
to be a full member of the EU despite the custom union
agreement signed in 1996. Turkey is the first country to
enter the Custom Union with the EU without being a full
member. The Custom Union covers industrial and
processed agricultural products while agricultural
products remain out of its scope. Turkey should adjust
her agricultural policy to adopt the Common
Agricultural Policies.
3.1.2. Vertical Integration and Contract Farming in
Turkey.
When we evaluate the structure of Turkish food
industry from the point of view of vertical coordination,
the relationships have been varied from spot market
transactions, long established client relations to
contractual arrangements. As observed in the
investigated region, the spot market transaction was
dominant in some sub-sectors while contract farming
was the only way of vertical coordination in others.
National figures about the application of contract
farming are not available. Beet sugar processing, and the
commercialized part of broiler production operate under
contractual relationships. In vegetable and fruit
processing contract farming has been used widely along
with the other procurement ways. In these chapter,
broiler industry and beet sugar processing have been
reviewed separately while vertical coordination and the
structure of contractual relationship in other sub-sectors
are presented based on a field survey conducted in theVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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Bursa region
8. This region had 6.2% of total plants, 8.2%
of established capacity, and 7.4% of total production of
Turkish food industry in 1990 (Anonymous 1993).
Although these figures reveal rather unimportant
amounts, fruit and vegetable processing, vegetable oil,
dairy and hop industry are well developed in this region.
Hop production and processing exist only in Bilecik
Province (Rehber 1998). Approximately 50-60% of the
fruit and vegetable processing plants which have rather
large capacities are located in this region. For example,
24 of the largest tomato paste plants of the 42 total are in
this region. Bursa Province by itself has supplied more
than 55% of the Turkish tomato paste production (Akgul
and Rehber 1993).
No special legislative arrangement related to
contract farming existed in Turkey until 1996. In June of
1996, the Ministry of Agriculture circulated a directive
(regulation) in order to control contractual arrangements.
Despite the general character of this direction, it was
highly detailed even describing a certain pricing
formula. This direction was immediately amended two
years later in August of 1998, to outline a general
framework compared to the detailed structure of the
previous one. It was not more than a standard contract
form giving the Directorates of the Ministry of
Agriculture at the province and district levels the right to
control and partake in the arbitration process as a third
party.
3.1.2.1.Broiler Industry
The first attempt to establish a modern broiler
industry as in the other sectors was initiated by
Government through the foundation of a Central Poultry
Research Center in 1930
Considerable progress was not be achieved until
1950. Around 1950, introduction of improved parent
stocks contributed a real transition in the sector. Further
progress could was realized after 1963 by using
imported hybrid varieties from abroad. And a
remarkable increase in exports at the beginning of 1980s
has accelerated this process (Gunes et al. 1990).
Despite the rapid development observed during the
last two decades, about 60% of the total broiler
production is grown by independent growers who have
no contractual coordination with processors. Therefore a
considerable amount of broilers in Turkey are grown by
traditional methods and are handled in an open market
system in an unorganized manner. According to 1997
data, there were 6,785 broiler farms plus farms which
                                                       
8 Bursa, Balikesir, Bilecik and Canakkale Provinces were
included.
have poultry production as a side-activity. Of which,
72.6% have a capacity less than 5,000 head/per year.
The beginning of the vertically coordinated broiler
production went back to 1969 with the Turkish
Development Foundation (TKV) which was established
to serve rural development. At the beginning, TKV
started broiler production in a certain region by
providing selective credit. Later, small size broiler
growers were organized under regional Corporations
which provide chicks, feed, services, processing and
marketing. In 1985 these regional corporations were
organized under a central Corporations (Holding) was
known as KOYTUR. In recent years, the number of
regional corporations has reached 11, the number of
growers who have a contract relationship with these
corporations is 2,220 with total 75,000,000 bird/year
capacity, almost 20% of the total production capacity of
Turkey (TKV, 1998). Beside KOYTUR, 20 corporations
have controlled 90% of the industrialized part of broiler
production through contractual arrangements with
growers. Two types of vertical coordination could be
observed. First, some are fully integrated. From growers
to wholesalers, all activities from chick raising to
processing are under control of the integrator in this
system. A second system can be called partial
integration. Either some of the production inputs (chicks
or/and feed) or some services i.e. processing and feed
preparation are provided from other companies outside
the system.
Broiler contracts vary from integrator to integrator.
Many broiler contracts are only one flock in duration.
Both growers and processors have non-renewal rights. In
general, the contacts have two common features. One of
main features is the division of responsibility for
providing inputs. The other important feature is the
method used for grower compensation. The growers
provide land, housing facilities, utilities (electricity and
water), and labor. Operating expenses such as
maintenance, repair, cleaning, and manure and dead bird
disposal are also the responsibility of the farmer. The
integrator provide chicks, feed, medication and advisory
services. Typically, the processor company owns and
operates hatcheries, feed mills and processing plant
while providing transportation of feed and live birds.
Other inputs such as fuel and litter are the responsibility
of the producer. Most of the integrators require strict
technical qualifications regarding construction and
equipment of chicken houses.
Integrators can force changes in operation whenever
they wish since there is no contract to prevent such
changes. Broiler growers often complain that these
changes are excessively expensive (For example new
ventilation system) but they have no choice since theyVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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have already had large sunk investments.
Although the calculation methods are changing from
integrator to integrator, most broiler contracts have a
similar remuneration schemes based on the performance
evaluation. The performance payment is based on the
feed conversation and mortality rates. A fixed price is
determined and an adjustment made based on the
grower’s relative performance.
Standard mortality and feed conversion rates are
determined differently from integrator to integrator. The
standard feed conversion rate is calculated as an average
of the growers performances who are in the production
scheme. The standard mortality rate is determined
arbitrarily based on technical assumptions, generally 5%.
Calculation of the amount paid to the growers is
presented here as an example. The investigated firm has
determined the standard feed conversion and mortality
rates are 2.0 (fs) and 5% (ms). The grower has a 10,000
(c) head capacity, a 1.9 (f) of feed conversion rate and a
7% of (m) mortality rate. The fixed basic price per kg
live weight is 88,000 (p1) TL. 125,000 (p2) TL is the
amount considered for extra feed conversion rate above
or below the standard, whereas 200 (p3)TL is the amount
considered for extra 1% mortality rate above or below
the standard.
The amount supplied by the growers;
S = c x f (1-m) = 10,000x 1.9 (1-0.07) = 17,760 kg.
Since the grower has a lower feed conversion rate
((fs-f) = (2.0-1.9) = 0.1), he will get a bonus per kg equal
to (fs-f) x p2 =  0.1x125,000 = 12,500 TL/kg. The 7%
mortality rate is 2% ((ms-m) = (7-5) = 2) more than the
standard rate. Therefore he should get less as a penalty
equal to (ms-m) x p3 = 2 x 200 = 400 TL/kg.
The price paid to this grower equal to p = p1+- (fs-f)
x p2  +- (ms-m) x p3.
p= 88,000+ 12,500 – 400 = 100,100 TL/g.
The total amount of payment;
T = S x p = 17,670 x 100,100 = 1,768,767,000 TL .
The method of calculation is presented above can be
formulized as follow;
T= S x p
T = (c x f  (1-m) ) x (p1+- (fs-f) x p2 +- (ms-m) x p3
3.1.2.2. Beet-sugar Processing
There were 25 beet sugar processing plants
operating under the Sugar Factories Corporation. Four of
them recently have been privatized. The Sugar-beet
Producers Cooperatives own these plants as one of the
partners of the ownership before.
All sugar beet production has been under contract
farming since the beginning of the industry. This
production system is also important as the first
implementation of contract farming. Sugar beet has been
processed in stock companies, which are a kind of SEEs.
There were, 407,350 farmers producing sugar beet under
contractual relations with this organization in 1994.
There are also Sugar-beet Producers Cooperatives.
The relationships between companies and producers was
being organized by these cooperatives. Until 1994, the
farmer who was in contractual relationship with a
company had to be a member of the cooperative. Since
1994, this has not been required and the role of
cooperatives is not as important. After the privatization
period of 1980s contract provisions were being
determined in favor of the farmers by the producers
cooperative that had the ownership of some factories
which were running as SEEs before
 (Anonymous 1994).
It was argued that, this ownership integration through
producers’ cooperative has increased the financial
efficiency in the privatized plant as in the U.S.
 (Koening
1995). Indeed, in Turkey, there would not be any
difference in farmers’ income through the type of
integrator because of sugar beet prices are subject to the
government price support system and is determined by
the government, The increased efficiency in the grower-
owned factories could be achieved through efficient
management, better-organized delivery and payment
procedures.
In the sugar-beet production a simple pricing system
is used based on the sugar content of the beet. Every
year, the basic price which is based of 16% average
sugar content has been announced by the Council of the
Ministries. A premium is added or deducted according to
the sugar content of the beet supplied. The premium is
calculated by dividing the basic price by 16. The amount
calculated for 1% sugar content is used as a premium,
which is being used calculation the price paid to farmers.
If the supplied beet has a sugar content more than 16%,
the amount is added equal the amount of extra percent
times premium. If the sugar content below 16%, same
system is used vise-versa. In the price system, an extra
premium is also paid for early harvest to regulate supply.
The beet-sugar plants are classified into four groups
according to the harvest period to determine the early
harvest premium. That is, the early harvest premium
varied from group to group. This premium is paid only if
the beet has sugar content greater than or equal to 16%.
Detailed information about the contract content and
implementation are presented based on survey data in
the last section of this chapter.Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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3.1.2.3. The Structure of Contract Farming in the
Studied Region
In the studied region, contractual relationships have
been widely observed, mainly in tomato paste, vegetable
and fruit processing industries along with spot market
transactions. Contractual arrangements account for 75%
as an average especially in tomato and peas production.
In dairy industry there was no straightforward
contractual links between producer and dairies. About
60-70% of the raw milk was sold in open market, the
remaining 30-40% was handled in some kind of open-
auction system. In the open market, processors either
have stable or mobile procurement centers or bought raw
milk through brokers and other middlemen.
In the auction system, as widely used in Balikesir
Province, producers are organized under a cooperative or
mostly under Village Service Unions which are semi-
governmental organizations. These village service
unions are having an active role in organizing these
auctions in favor of farmers. The role of these
organizations are similar to the bargaining cooperatives
in USA (Marcus and Frederick 1994). However, there
are some problems in practice.
It was observed that, in olive processing and
vegetable oil industries, cooperative organizations, spot
market transactions and long standing clients'
relationship accounted more than those of contractual
arrangements. "MARMARABIRLIK" (The Marmara
Union of Olive Sale Cooperatives) in olive and
"TRAKYABIRLIK" (The Edirne Union Oil Seeds Sale
Cooperatives) in sunflower seed processing have
significant shares and also have a regulation role in the
table olive, olive oil and sunflower oil markets. In the
region of study some olive producers are also members
of the “TARIS (A Top Management of four Agricultural
Sale Cooperatives)” which is located in Aegean Region.
Maramarabirlik, which is a sale cooperatives union, has
the biggest share in olive processing and marketing in
the region with its 8 local cooperatives and 37,418
members. Trakyabirlik is also a very efficient nation-
wide union which has 48 local cooperatives and 138,806
members. This union's 1995 share of sunflower growth
for oil production was 34.4% (Dayanikli 1995). However,
these agricultural cooperatives have significant problems as
mentioned before.
Hop production was included in the scope of this
research because of its interesting features concerning
producers and industry relationship. In the hop industry,
private sector, a state enterprise and a farmer cooperative
organization have been sharing the market. One private
company tries to grow raw material in its own plantation
along with contractual relationships with farmers as an
out-grower scheme
 (Glover 1987). Another private
company and State Monopoly operate in the market only
during harvesting season as buyers with an advance-paid
price system. There is also a farmers’ cooperative
organization as a third alternative. In such a structure,
despite the favorable offers, the private company could
not succeed in increasing the number of the contractee
farmers and also its market share over 60%. There is
competition between farmers cooperatives and private
companies. The role of the cooperative in marketing
shows the importance of the farmers organization in
contractual relationships and of obtaining bargaining
power through that organizations (Koening 1995; Ling
and Liebrand 1995; Rehber 1996).
3.1.2.3.1. Contents of Contracts. Twenty five
contracts have been examined from the region pertaining
to this study. There were no special legislative base in
Turkey until 1996 for production contracts which were
prepared mainly on the basis of the contract sample of
the Turkish Sugar Industry Stock Companies or of the
personal preferences of the integrators.
There were some differences in the contents of the
contract details often written in a language not easy to
understood by farmers. They appear as provisions that
the producers should obey arranged by the processors.
Contracts generally compromise 4 main sections
(Buccola 1980). In the first section, both parties are
defined; in the second, the economic provisions of the
contract and the responsibilities of both parties are
presented. In the third section includes technical
conditions and the last section includes the authority and
method for resolving disputes and dissatisfactions. The
end of a contract has a signature and authorization clause.
The length of the contracts found in our sample were
mostly one year; the only exception was the hop
production contracts which span more than one year.
Eighty percent of the examined contracts are based on
tonnage while 20% have an acreage basis. The contracts
have been signed by an individual producer or by a
producers group in which all producers are responsible
reciprocally to each other. Each producer group has a
representative or a responsible producer who has the
right to change or add provisions to the contract and also
acts as the representative of the processor. The share of
this group approach is about 60% of the investigated
contracts. Although the contract indicates both
producer's and processor's responsibilities, the producer
is also responsible for extra debt receipts, especially
when he has received inputs or payment in advance from
the integrators. While the share of payment in advance in
contract implementations was 76%, the share of the
contracts which have a debt receipts placed was aboutVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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60%.
The price and payment systems vary from contract
to contract. The rate of the contracts in which the
constant price approach has been used was 36%,
whereas the constant price plus a premium system was
used in 44% of the investigated contracts.
3.1.2.3.2.Contracts From the Producers' Point of
View. In the study region, interviews have been carried
out with 75 contractee and 16 farmers who do not have
contractual relations. Of these 65% have been producing
field tomatoes. Contract farming was also widely used in
the production of broccoli and green pepper. In the
production of sugar beet and tobacco, contractual
relationship is compulsory as in all of Turkey. Sixty two
percent of the farmers who were interviewed, indicated
guaranteed price and sale as the main reasons for signing
a contract. Credit facilities and technical aids were
indicated as secondary reasons. Producers generally
interpret contracts as the only way of coordination, and
are not necessarily being interested in what is written on
the contracts. However, 54% of the producers who
replied to questions about contract provisions, said they
did not read the contract beforehand and merely signed
it. Twenty percent of the producers who read the
contract indicated they could not understand most of the
language used. In practice, contracts are prepared by the
processors and offered to the producers to sign who
would like to produce under contract. Sixty percent of
the farmers have expressed some problems concerning
the contractors’ responsibilities such as delay in
payment, delivery, inadequate technical input aids, and
information. Processors would like to spread delivery
over a long period. This causes a backlog in front of the
delivery points and very often quality deteriorates
resulting in a loss of the quality premium.
Interviewed farmers have not been happy with the
group approach to signing contracts. For example, in
sugar beet production, each group consisted of 30
farmers. The first farmer in the list was the group leader
and the second one was the second in command, they
sign the contract for group members. The most
important problem with this approach is that group
members do not meet and do not feel responsible to each
other. It is clear that there is no benefit with this group
approach beyond being a sound guarantee for the
processor. Attitudes of group leaders acting as
representatives of the processors would not be an
acceptable behavior for the other farmers in the group.
Almost all of the producers would like to have a
contract which is authorized by a third party, preferably
represented by the Farmers Union or Directorate of
Agriculture or by the so called 'muhtar' (the elected head
of village).
Respondent farmers replied 95% positively to the
question for organizing a bargaining cooperative as
widely seen in the USA. Sixty five percent of them
stated difficulties on establishing such an organization.
In the study region, 25 farmers, who are not
involved in a contractual relationship were interviewed.
Only 16 questionnaires were evaluated. Seventy three
percent indicated they were familiar with contract
farming, and 56% had contracts previously. Disputes
related to price and method of payment were primary
reasons for not continuing with contracts. As observed in
the hop production, these dissatisfactions along with the
availability of other marketing alternatives have caused
an attitude against contract farming.
However, even the contractee farmers had a
tendency for using other alternatives to decrease market
risk.
3.1.2.3.3.Contracts From the Processors’Point of
View. It is a fact that the processors prepare contracts
which means that they determine the conditions of the
contracts. However, most of the interviewed processors
have agreed that all contract provisions could not be
realized. Consequently, contract production could not
function as a way of providing raw material, which have
quality and quantity requirements.
The contractor firms argued that, farmers are
reluctant to use modern inputs and technologies which
were generally advised by the field experts of the firms.
According to the processors, the most significant
problem has been purchasing the commodities and
payment. Except for the sugar beet price which is subject
to government intervention, all product prices are
affected by the price in the open market regardless of the
price in contracts. When the spot market prices are
higher than the prices placed in contract, it was argued
that farmers were selling the products in open market,
which have been produced under contract. In order to
avoid this, farmers are forced to sign an open debt
receipt in addition to the contract. Moreover, the farmer
who is acting in the same manner repeatedly has been
punished by contract exclusion for at least a few years.
In practice, this approach was called the 'red pencil'.
Conversely, when the contract price is over the open
market price, farmers try to supply more product which
they have obtained from relatives or from outside of the
contract's parcels.
There has been a competition between firms and
provinces. When a shortage occurs in the production or
when demand for processed food has increased, firms
which do not have any contractee farmers, have been
offering higher prices to the contractee farmers of otherVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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firms.
Another significant problem for processors in the
situation of disputes, relates to the fact that the contract
itself has no meaning. Going through the court created
long delays in order to solve disagreements and disputes
between producers and processors. That is why the need
for arbitration or a conciliation system is clear.
The processors who do not have any contractual
relationship stated they have used contract farming in the
past, but no longer do so because they could easily
purchase raw material in domestic open or foreign
markets. Thirty three percent of them indicated that they
could use this system if they needed it.
3.2. General Structure of Food Processing Industry and
Contract Farming in the USA
3.2.1. General Overview
The U.S. food system from farm to consumer can be
characterized as a capital-intensive and vertically
coordinated system through ownership, contracts and
other vertical ties. The other main feature of the U.S.
food system is a trend toward larger and fewer firms at
every stage of food system from farming to retailing.
From the general economic indicators point of view,
agriculture is the one of smaller industries, producing
2% of national output and directly employing about 2%
of the labor force in 1995. But, agriculture indirectly
accounts for much more employment and contributes to
national gross domestic product (GNP) through other
industries such as manufacturing, processing,
wholesaling, and retail trade. If we consider all
contributions, agriculture is responsible for providing
15.8% of the total employment and 14% of the nation’s
GNP (Cramer et al. 1997).
There were 2.1 millions farms in the U.S. with an
average 469 acres farm size, in 1995 down from five
million farms in 1954. Numbers do not reflect the real
concentration. It is argued that most of the nation’s food
and fibers is produced on about 600,000 full-time
commercial farms (Hamilton 1994a). Most of the farms
are still characterized as family farms. In 1992,
individual proprietorships or family farms accounted for
more than 85% of all farms, partnerships accounted for
10%, corporations 4%, and others (estates and trust) less
than 1% (Cramer et al 1997). Although a few percent of
all farms are incorporated, corporations own 12% of all
land and market 22% of the total value of all farm crops
(Suits 1995).
Today, almost 90% of farm products reach
consumers after having some handling and processing.
Within food processing industries, the most dynamic
branch was fresh and processed red meat industry. The
meat packing and processing industry evolved quickly
into a highly integrated, capital-intensive industry. By
1899 the meat industry accounted for 26% of
manufacturing sector sales. Similarly, factory processing
of butter and cheese may have begun as early as 1840s
(Connor and Schiek 1997). By the turn of the century,
about one-forth of butter and 90% of all cheese was
factory made. Canning of sea food as well as fruits and
vegetables began in the US around 1820.
Two of today’s best known canned food companies
were both established in 1869. Grain milling grew
relatively slowly, by 1899 it ranked a distant second
among the food industries with 20% of the total sales.
The U.S. beet sugar industry was also established
about 1869. Animal feed industry was first recorded
during this period as by products of grain milling. Until
the soybean industry was established in the 1920s, the
animal feed industry depended on fish meal as the
principal protein sources.
Until the 1850s, nearly all companies were
organized as partnerships or proprietorships. In the early
1890s, a massive merger movement began in the U.S.
Food processing companies played prominent roles in
this industrial restructuring (Connor and Schiek 1997).
The “Beef Trust” was one of the best known and
most successful companies to develop control over its
market through market-sharing arrangements and
extensive vertical integration. One of the best
documented history of this period was the “Sugar Trust”
and it was reorganized under the name “ American Sugar
Refining Company “ (Amstar) in 1891. At the beginning
the Trust was not successful, but in 1893 Amstar and
other sugar refineries adopted the basing point pricing
system that has persisted to this day.
During the first quarter of the twentieth century,
development of the food processing sector grew about
150%. This was slower than the growth rate of the entire
manufacturing sector. During this period, the share of
the food sector in manufacturing was approximately
22% and remained relatively stable until the late 1940s.
The number of the food processing plants continued
to increase to a peak of about 65,000 in 1920. A great
decrease in the number of plants has been observed until
1987. The Census of 1992 showed that the number of
the plants remained almost constant at 20,000 since the
previous census in 1987 (Table 3.2). The greatest
decrease was observed during the periods of 1965-1970
and 1979-1989 mainly through merger, acquisition and
vertical integration (Connor and Schiek 1997).
Concentration of the firms is a reality in the U.S.
Food industry. The total sales of the nation’s top 20 food
and beverage manufacturers rose 32% between 1992 and
1997. In 1997, these companies accounted for 52% of
the industry-wide sales, higher than their 46.5% share inVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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1992. The total share of the top four firms is 20.3% in
1997 (Anonymous 1999a).
In the U.S., Government intervenes in the
agricultural market through several market mechanisms.
The U.S. farm price support was initiated in the early
1930s and despite several modifications in detail,
general structure was not changed. There are four types
of market intervention mechanisms; price support,
restriction of supply, credit programs and subsidies
(Suits 1995).
Since the 1930s, marketing orders have an important
role in the marketing of agricultural products using
classified pricing schemes, quality and quantity
restrictions, and output restrictions orders. Marketing
orders cover many markets: Production of tree nuts,
dried fruits, hops, tart cherries. olives, and cranberries is
covered by Federal Marketing orders. About 65% of the
U.S. milk is federally regulated and 80% is regulated
under federal or state laws (Carlton and Perloff 1980 ).
Marketing orders enable producers to organize
marketing boards which are given powers to control the
production and marketing commodities. It has been
stated that, marketing boards are the only unregulated
legal monopolies permitted in the U.S. (Suits 1995). The
boards could limit production and regulate prices by
restricting the quality and the volume of the products
and by assigning quotas to individual producers.
Future markets are used to facilitate many
agricultural products in the U.S. since mid-1800s such as
Minneapolis Grain Exchange and The Chicago Board of
Trade. The main purpose of these exchanges is to
provide a place in which the activities of buyer and
sellers determine the prices of commodities. At these
exchanges, traders buy and sell futures contracts as
physical commodities (Cramer et al. 1997). Of course
there is some close relationship between contract
production and the futures market. On one hand the
rapid growth in contract farming has encouraged futures
trading in other commodities. For example, contract
farming in broilers has led to an increase in futures
trading in corn, soybeans and soybeans products On the
other hand futures markets generate considerable
information as price quotes permeate the whole market
(Lethould 1976).
Cooperatives have a major role in the U.S. food
system. The latest available data shows that there were
2,173 marketing and 1,496 supply cooperatives (the
numbers were 5,727 and 3,222 in 1960 respectively).
Farmer cooperatives are important for producers,
marketing about 31% of the agricultural products and
providing 29% of the major inputs such as fertilizer,
feed. seed etc
9. In 1997, farm cooperatives share ($10.15
billion) was nearly 9% of the total agriculture sector net
value-added ($92.8 billion). Marketing cooperatives
accounted for nearly 68% of cooperatives gross and net
value added, farm supply 28% and related service
cooperatives 4% (Kraenzle and Cummins 1999).
Among the marketing cooperatives, bargaining
cooperatives are special for U.S. agriculture. This type of
cooperative is also important for the contract production
because of their main function in determination of trade
terms between producers and processor. The most
frequent trade terms that are bargained for by bargaining
cooperatives are price, time of payment, quality
provision, rights and responsibilities related with
production (Marion 1986). In the USA, in many
agricultural bargaining cooperatives have become an
integral part of the marketing system of certain
agricultural commodities (Marcus and Frederick 1994).
In 1992, there were 29 active fruit and vegetables
bargaining associations representing 36 commodity
groups (Iskow and Sexton 1992). Inability to increase
membership, managing supply and controlling non-
member free riders are among the main problems facing
bargaining associations.
There is considerable support for cooperative group
actions in agriculture through laws in the USA. The
Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, Cooperative Marketing
Act of 1926, Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act of
1937 and Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967 have
provided some arrangements to advance group actions in
the marketplace (Torgerson 1998).
3.2.2. Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming in the
USA.
Almost one-third of the total value of production on
U.S. farms is produced under contractual arrangement.
While contracting has been significant and growing
since 1960s, farmers have used contracts to produce or
market agricultural commodities since early the 1900s.
Changes in the number of the farms involved  in  vertical
coordination between 1970-1990 can be seen from Table
3.3. According to the 1993 Farm Costs and Return
Surveys (FCRS), 32% of the total value of agricultural
production was produced under contract arrangements
(Perry et al. 1996). Between 1991 and 1997, the share of
commodities produced under marketing contracts
increased from 16% to 22% of the total U.S. value of
                                                       
9 Cooperative aggregate market share in the United States
measured at the farm gate is roughly 30%. The share is
significant moreover, across several industry groups, including
dairy 77%, cotton 36%, grain and soybeans 36%, fruit and
vegetables 20%, and livestock 11% (Sexton 1990, p. 709).Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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production (Perry et al.1997). There are generally two
types of contracts: marketing and production contracts.
Marketing contracts: Refers to verbal or written
agreements between a contractor and a grower that sets a
price-or pricing system- and an outlet for the commodity
before harvest or before the commodity is ready to be
marketed. This type of contract can take many forms:
• Forward sales of a growing crop, where the contract
provides for later delivery and establishes a price or
contains provisions for setting a price latter.
• Price setting after delivery based on a formula that
considers grade and yield.
• Pre-harvest pooling arrangements, where the amount
received is determined by the net pool receipts for the
quantity sold.
Production contracts: These contracts specify
detailed production practices, input supplied by the
contractor, quality and quantity of a particular
commodity, and set a price or pricing mechanism.
In the U.S. agriculture, farmers can be contractors.
As in the outgrowers schemes, big farmers, often, in
animal production acting as contractors. The farmer as a
contractor, can specialize in one of the stage of
production, and pay another producer to either provide
young animals or finish the production of commodity.
Marketing contracts are often used for crop
production. In 1993, almost 40% of the value of all fruit
and vegetables were produced under marketing
contracts. The percentage of other crops produced under
marketing contracts were sugar beets (82%), cotton
(33%), soybeans (9.4%) and corn (8%).
Production contracts are more likely used for
livestock production. Poultry and poultry products
produced under production contracts accounted for over
50% of the total value. On the other hand, 33% of the
value of production hogs and 14% of the cattle were
covered by production contracts (Banker and Perry
1999).
The contractor usually stipulates grading standards
along with terms for compensating the grower. More
commonly, in California and Washington, the amount
paid to the grower is negotiated through a bargaining
association that represent several producers.
Despite the availability of several legislative
arrangements which are directly or indirectly affecting
production contracts, there is no specific regulation
directly related by contract farming at federal level.
Many states have considered legislative proposal, but
only Minnesota, Wisconsin and Kansas have enacted
new laws on the subject (Hamilton 1994b). In 1990,
Minnesota enacted legislation to protect growers.
Among other stipulations, the law requires notice before
termination, the right to cure, and reimbursement for
investments in the case of premature termination. This
law has become a model for other legislative proposals.
In 1993, Wisconsin passed legislation that allows a
grower a 72-hour grace period to cancel a contract. It
also requires integrators to specify in writing all
conditions that might cause deductions in payments to
growers (Levin-Solomons, 1999). Processors often
oppose such legislation. For instance it was reported
that, legislation to protect poultry growers in Alabama in
1994 failed after a $90,000 lobbying campaign by
processors who claimed that the law would undermine
the broiler industry in that state (Hamilton 1994b).
Enforcement of lien is an important legal issue to
protect farmers. During a production failure resulting in
losses to creditors or in the case of bankruptcy, the lien
secures the amount to be paid for the product by the
processor to the grower or producer. For instance,
California enacted a producer’s lien statute to protect
farmers (Peterson and Peck, 1997). Unlike California,
Oregon has two separate producer liens. The
Agricultural Producer Lien covers fruit, berries,
vegetables or meat animals and The Grain Producers
Lien covers grains (Watson, 1997).
Vertical coordination structure and contracting in
some of the important sub-sectors from the contract
production and backward integration viewpoints are
analyzed in detail below.
3.2.2.1. Broiler Industry.
After World War II, the broiler industry grew into
one of the most integrated of the U.S. agricultural
industries. Today integrators produce nearly all broilers
under contract with growers. Broiler production nearly
tripled between 1940 and 1945 despite poor feed quality
and heavy disease losses (Martinez 1999). The high
volume of military demand actively encouraged
production in newly emerging commercial production
areas (Goodhau and Rausser 1999). Besides this
incentive, following the war, adoption of technological
advance in genetics, disease control, nutrition and
material handling have accelerated development of
industry. These innovations increased the size of the
production unit. During the early stage of broiler
industry, growers would buy feed from a dealer, chicks
from a hatchery, and other supplies from another dealer
selling to the processors who offered the highest price.
Along with the high capital requirements of new
technologies, fluctuation in the live broiler prices left the
broiler growers in financial difficulties.
Large feed companies recognized the potential of
broiler industry and established production contract with
growers. The first recorded broiler contract was signed
in 1933 (Martinez 1999).Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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A rapid increase in the higher supply caused a drop
in the live broiler prices toward end of the 1950s. Many
hatcheries and feed companies experienced considerable
losses because of the overproduction and depressed
broiler prices. In order to coordinate production capacity
at each stage, feed companies became more directly
involved in the broiler business. They developed a closer
relationship with processors by acquiring or merging
with processors and by building growing facilities.
As feed companies increased their processing
operation, independent processors and producers found
themselves with fewer markets for buying and selling
broilers. Hence, independent processors established their
own contracts with feed companies to obtain birds or
with growers to produce the birds.
In the 1970s, many feed companies left the broiler
industry because of depressed broiler prices and high
input costs. Processors took over control of almost all
stages to gain efficiencies from improved coordination.
Presently, few major processors control the vertical
stages in broiler industry from breeding to market ready
products, through vertical integration and production
contracts. In 1950, 95% of broiler producers were
independent. More recently, independent producers
accounted for only 10% of total broiler production,
whereas 88% were produced under a contract
arrangement and 2% were produced in company-owned
broiler facilities (vertical integration) (Martinez 1996).
Today nearly all broilers are grown under contract (92%)
or in integration (8%) (Table 3.3).
A 1996 survey of broiler companies conducted by
the Broiler Industry listed 48 companies, which account
for almost the entire U.S. broiler production. The top 15
companies jointly control 77% of the total industry
production. The largest broiler company produces about
22% of the entire broiler output. According to a survey
conducted with 19 broiler companies, 17 company were
using tournaments as the way of setting prices, the
remaining two companies were using fixed performance
standards (Tsoulouhas and Vukina 1999). Knoeber and
Thurman found much stronger evidence of risk
reduction in the broiler chicken industry under relative
performance contracts. Their research concluded that
89% of the broiler growers showed statistically
significant variance reduction with relative performance
contracts as compared with standards (absolute)
performance contracts (Knoeber and Thurman 1995).
As the broiler industry has become more integrated,
the types of the contracts have also changed. The first
contracts between integrators and growers were open
account contracts. The other types were guaranty-
price contracts, flat-fee contracts, feed conversation
contracts. Today, combination contracts are often used
which combine the desirable attributes of previously
used contracts.
Production contracts (resource providing contracts)
are legal agreements between an integrator and a farmer
(producer) that bind the producer to specific production
practices. Broiler contracts vary, but all of them have
two common features. One of main features is the
division of responsibility for providing inputs. The other
important feature is the method used for grower
compensation. Growers provide land and housing
facilities, utilities (electricity and water) and labor.
Operating expenses such as maintenance, repair, chicken
house clean up, and manure and dead bird disposal are
also the responsibility of the farmer (Vukina and Foster
1998). The integrator provides chicks, feed, medication
and advisory services. Typically, the processor company
owns and operates hatcheries, feed mills, processing
plant and provides transportation of feed and live birds.
The other inputs such as fuel and litter can be the
responsibility of either the integrator or the producer or
can be shared. Most of the integrators require strict
technical qualifications regarding construction and
equipment of chicken houses. Chicks of certain genetic
characteristics and feed mix are also provided by the
integrators. Broiler contracts can be only one flock or
more than just one production cycle (Hamilton 1994b).
Poultry (or livestock) contracts differ from those
used in other commodities because contracts do not
involve the sale of commodities, instead they create
other forms of legal relationship such as service
contracts. That means contract growers do not own the
product. They are being compensated for what they
provide, land, building, fuel and labor. That is why
producers could be accepted as relative piece-rate
workers (Skully 1998).
Problems between grower and processor often result
in litigation. The more common claims include: Early
contract termination, requirements for additional
improvements, manipulation of quality, quantity or cost
of inputs, under-weighing of poultry and feed, mis-
evaluation of the producer’s performance etc. (Hamilton
1994b).
Integrators can force changes in operation whenever
they wish, since there is no contract to prevent such
changes. Broiler growers often complain that these
changes are excessively expensive (For example new
ventilation system), but almost they have no choice since
they have large sunk investments. It was argued that in
this situation growers face a “hold-up” problem (Lewin-
Solomon 1999). Another source of risk for the grower is
non-renewal of the contract (Aust, 1997).
Most broiler contracts have a similar remuneration
scheme which include minimum guaranteed payment,Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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performance payment, and disaster payment. The
performance payment is based on a fixed base price per
pound of live meat produced and the variable bonus
payment is based on the grower’s relative performance.
The bonus payment is determined as a percentage of
differences between average settlement costs of all
growers that belong to the integrator’s particular center
whose flocks were harvested in the same period and
producer’s individual settlement costs. Settlement costs
are obtained by adding chick, feed, medication and other
customary flock costs and dividing by the total pounds
of live poultry produced. For below-average settlement
costs (above-average performance) the grower receives a
positive bonus, and for above average settlement costs,
he receives a negative bonus. A grower with settlement
costs substantially above the average cost (typically this
threshold is set at 1.25 cents) will be excluded from the
average, hence, other growers are not rewarded when
one grower performs badly. Similarly, costs that are
substantially below average also are excluded from the
average (Vukina and Foster 1998).
The total payment to the grower can be formulized
as follow.
R = (b + B) q
where, b= Base payment per live pound, B= Bonus
payment per live pound, and q= the number of pounds of
live poultry.
If the producer’s revenue based on performance
payment is smaller than some guarantied amount, the
minimum payment formula will be applied. In the case
of a disaster such as fire, flood or storm, involving a lost
of a part or entire of the flock, the grower will be
compensated based on the disaster payment.
Organization of poultry growers is important. The
recent most significant attempt was the formation of
National Contract Poultry Grower Association.
3.2.2.2. Pork Industry
At the beginning of the twentieth century, most hogs
were slaughtered by the five largest packers. They
generally purchased most of their hogs through
commissions from local markets.
Since the beginning of the 1900s, the number of
farms that rise hogs have been falling and the average
inventory per farm has risen steadily. This trend has
continued during all of the twentieth century. Prior to
1993, most pigs were raised on farms with fewer than
1000 animals in inventory. In 1996, 4,880 U.S. farms
with at least 2,000 pigs in inventory accounted for 51%
of the total U.S. swine inventory (Zering 1998). The
pork sector has two production stages, farrowing and
finishing. Two decades ago, most hog operations were
integrated farrowing-finishing operations. There has
been a trend toward larger, more specified farrowing and
finishing operations in recent years (Ward, 1997).
In recent years, multi-year marketing contracts have
been widely used between the large hog producer-
integrators and large packers. In 1999, 59% of the hogs
in the U.S. were obtained through multi-year contracting
while only 2% were contracted in the 1970s and 1980s
(Martinez 1999). These contracts typically specify that
the producer deliver a certain quantity of hogs to a
certain location at a specified time. In return, the
producer receives a market-based price that is adjusted
for quality premiums. A considerable amount of large
hog producers sell their animals on the open market. A
majority of the contract hog production is horizontally
contracted among producers. The producers having more
assets, managerial skills, and are the risk-taker provide
the hogs and the feed to others who raise them
(Lawrence et al.1997).
Hog production and marketing contracts are
generally written to last five to twelve years and often
require the provision of a notice of termination no
shorter than a specified period, usually about six months.
Provisions often exist to extend the initial terms for an
additional time period subject to mutual agreement. In
addition, it is possible to renegotiate the terms if new
technologies or regulation arise (Hennessy and
Lawrence 1999).
According to a 1994 survey, more than 50% of hogs
acquired by packers were under long-term contracts via
formal, written contracts with a definite term often
ranging from 4 to 7 years. Likewise, large producers
indicated that 63% of the contracts were written rather
than verbal and 59% were for a fixed period (1 to 15
years). The remaining contracts were verbal and
typically continued until canceled (Lawrence et al.1997).
The packers involved in these arrangements required a
minimum value of hogs with either minimum quality
standards or specific genetics.
According to another survey conducted in 1996 with
the 17 swine companies, two firms used tournaments,
nine used fixed performance standards, one used a fixed
payment per pound, one used the bracketed scheme, one
paid a fixed rent per square foot of the house, and three
companies were growing pigs on company-owned farms
(Tsoulouhas and Vukina 1999). Some research results
have shown that, relative to independent production,
contract farming reduces grower income variability.
Relative performance contracts have the potential to
further reduce income variability as opposed to absolute
or standard performance contracts. Martin (1997) argued
that relative performance contracts reduced incomeVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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variability for 36-70% of the contract growers (Martin
1997).
Historically, production contracts have existed in
three different categories of the pork production system,
and recently two additional categories of contracts have
emerged. Of these categories, the most common contract
is for the finishing phase (Martin 1999). Despite
different types of contracts changing from region to
region, widely used payment methods for the finishing
contracts were presented by Martin (1999) as follows:
i. Payment per pound of gain + Potential bonus;
Grower payment = $0.05 x (Pound gained) + feed
conversion bonus + mortality bonus.
ii. Payment per hog marketed + Potential bonus;
Grower payment = $10.00 x (head marketed) + feed
conversion bonus + mortality bonus.
iii. Payment per square foot or per pig space; Grower
payment = $4.00 x (Square feet available in barn) + any
potential bonuses or, Grower payment = $32.00 per pig
space per year + any potential bonus.
Bonuses and performance incentives are important
for both parties involved in the contract. In general, a
bonus is determined for a low feed conversion ratio and
a low mortality rate. For instance, if a standard feed
conversion ratio in the contract is 3.2, but the producer
achieve a 2.9 feed conversion, the grower would receive
a $1.50 bonus (50 cents for each 1/10 point difference)
on each animal marketed. For the mortality rate, a 2%
death loss standard frequently appears in contracts
(Martin 1999). Recently manure management also
became an important factor in contract arrangement.
Production contracts give the responsibility to
growers for providing facilities, labor utilities, waste
disposal, land, and water. Contractors provide feed,
livestock, veterinary care and medication, managerial
support, and marketing. The contractor bears all market
risk and keeps any residual profit or losses (Zering 1998;
Swinton and Martin 1997).
Pork producers are rather well organized. The
principal organization is The National Pork Producers
Council (NPPC) which is a producer organization that
claims a membership of 85,000 producers in 44
affiliated state associations. The NPPC is governed by a
board of directors elected by delegated who are elected
by producers (members) in each state association.
Another nation-wide organization is National Pork
Board which is an independent body of 15 members
appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. Members are
producers from at least 12 states and or importers
(Schrader 1998).
In the past, the role of cooperatives has been small
while their share of feed supplied to hog producers may
be as high as 45% in some areas (Schrader 1998). More
recently, Farmland Industries has attained about 6%
share of hogs slaughtered and other cooperatives have
actively increased their shares. New cooperatives have
been formed to supply feeder pigs for producers. Some
corn producers have formed hog production cooperatives
as a means to market corn. In addition, group marketing,
especially by smaller producers, is increasing (Schrader
1998).
3.2.2.3. Dairy Industry
Milk marketing in the U.S. is regulated by Federal
Milk Marketing Orders. Marketing orders classify milk
by ultimate use by consumers. For example, Class I is
milk for fluid consumption. Milk orders specify
minimum prices that buyers must pay for milk used in
each class. Federal order prices are minimums only.
Market conditions can often lead to prices above Federal
order minimums. Milk orders also specify rules for
distributing milk (Anonymous 1999b).
The dairy sector of the U.S. has been exception
among the other agricultural sector in that producers
cooperatives have an important role in milk marketing
and processing. According to1997 data, dairy
cooperatives received or bargained for 83% of all milk
sold by farmers. Ninety eight percent of the total amount
of milk received by the cooperatives came directly from
member-producers, the remaining 2% came from non-
members or non-cooperatives firms. Between 1992 and
1997, the number of dairy cooperatives decreased from
265 to 226 while the number of bargaining cooperatives
increased from 135 to 138 (Table 4.4) (Ling 1999).
Dairy cooperatives can be classified into three
categories based on their function in the marketing
channel (Ling and Liebrand 1998).
i. Bargaining cooperatives: These cooperatives operate
as bargaining associations. Government administered
milk prices serve as a floor and the starting price in the
bargaining process. Milk payment is usually pooled. In
1997 there were 138 pure marketing cooperatives, 44
cooperatives which have receiving stations were also
acting as bargaining cooperatives (Table 3.4).
ii. Bargaining-balancing cooperatives: These
cooperatives bargain for milk prices and also
manufacture the surplus into commodity dairy products
for supply balancing.
iii. Others include undifferentiated hard product
manufacturing, niche marketing, fluid processing and
diversified dairy cooperatives.
The experience of dairy cooperatives can be useful
for other agricultural industries facing pressure of
vertical integration.Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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3.2.2.4. Vegetable Processing
Vegetables for processing are mostly produced
under contracts. The only exemption are those perennials
crops such as asparagus and some potatoes which are
produced for both processing and fresh market (Marion
1986). In 1993, 11,700 farms reported at least one crop
production contract. Nearly half of these farms had
contracts that involved processed vegetables (Perry et al.
1996).
In general, a crop production contract indicates
which inputs will be provided by the contractor, limited
in most cases to seed and custom services such as
harvesting and hauling. The amount to be produced is
specified with detailed requirements regarding
production practices such as chemical and fertilizer
applications. Sometimes, the contracts’ quality
provisions can be very detailed and strictly enforced.
Many contracts include provisions requiring the grower
to use only pesticides that approved by contractor. The
contractor generally stipulates grading standards along
with terms of compensation the grower. According to a
Farm Costs and Returns Survey (FCRS), contractors
provided seed to nearly 80% of the farms with a single
production contract. The share of the farms getting
special hauling services was 70% and the percentage of
the chemical provided was reported as 60% (Perry et al.
1977).
For payment purposes they often use fixed price,
applying premiums or discounts based on the quality of
the crop. Vegetable producers are generally well
organized under a bargaining cooperative (Hamilton
1994b). In most cases, the association does not assume
title to the vegetables.
Vegetable contracts involve either guaranteed
shipments in pounds per week are based on acres of
production. Another special feature of vegetable
contracting is the application of “passed acres” in which
the integrator has the right not to harvest or accept all the
crops raised under the contract. One of the most
common reason for this application is the crop raised is
larger than the quantity the processor can handle
(Hamilton 1994b).
In order to get detailed information about contractual
relationships at the field and farm level between
producers and the first handler of the fruit and vegetables
(processors or wholesalers), the findings of a research
done by Hueth are summarized (Hueth 1999). The
contract between producers and integrators is generally a
detailed written agreement that sets forth specific plans
concerning when and how particular crop should be
grown. However, sometime coordination might also
realized with an informal mechanism through repeated
interaction. Even when a contract takes a written form,
there may still be a number of provisions which are only
implicitly understood by both parties. It was determined
that the coordination mechanisms used to arrange
contracts vary considerably across commodities.
Commodity attributes, local tradition, technology, and
government regulation were identified as important
factors which potentially affect the type of coordination
and content of the contracts.
Hueth (1999) mentioned the proprietary nature of
the contracts. He stated that “even if it is possible to
obtain an example of a written contract (some integrators
actually prohibit growers from sharing their contracts
with anyone but the grower’s lawyer), the explicit terms
of contracts reflected in formal documents are only part
of the story” .
According to a survey of processed and fresh market
commodities (15 fruits and vegetables), input control
was provided through selection of seed variety, and
plants, fertilizer, pesticides, labor, and financial support.
Monitoring is carried out by fieldmen who provide
technical information and communication in addition to
controlling grower’s behavior. Monitoring efficiency
were evaluated by the median of annual field visits per
grower for each commodity which was varied between 1
and 100 annual visits. The different bases were used for
the quality measurement. In ten of the commodities,
some form of in-house quality measurement was used; in
eleven commodities, government sponsored services;
and in five commodities, some form of third-party
services were used. In almost all of the contracts,
residual claimancy were used.
There is a difference in emphasis given on quality
measurement between processing and fresh market
integrators. All of the interviewed processors have been
using detailed measurement of quality to adjust grower
payment, while fresh market integrators have been rarely
adjusting the grower’s payment (Hueth 1999).
3.2.2.5. Beet-sugar Industry
Since the beginning of the U.S. beet sugar industry
in 1879, sugar beets have always been grown under a
contract. In 1995, there were 9 companies processing
beet sugar and three of them are grower owned
cooperatives. American Crystal Sugar Company (ACS)
was incorporated in 1899 as American Beet Sugar
Company. In 1971, the company cut 20% of the
contracted beet acreage in some states and closed some
processing plants in different states (Balbach 1998). The
differences between the farmers’ interest and decisions
of the company has created conflicts. Red River Valley
Sugar Beet Growers Association decided to buy
American Crystal and form a cooperative. The growers
who supply sugar beet to the company became theVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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owner. Despite the decline in the sugar-beet production
in the several western states, American Crystal Sugar’s
acreage increased from 165,000 acres in 1972 to 400,000
acres in 1992.
In the first sugar-beet contracts written in the U.S.,
payment was based on tonnage of beets delivered and
sugar content. Major changes in contracts were made
during WW I. The price of refined sugar rose more than
75% when price controls were removed. Sugar beet
growers wanted to share this sugar price increase.
Payment scales were changed to sugar content and the
market price of sugar base, and ACS changed the
payment system and added the average net selling price
base instead of a fixed price per ton. This system is still
used by the traditional owner-investment companies. In
the 1970s, the cooperative processors made another
change in beet contracts. They developed extractable
sugar contents. This contract is based on the actual
amount of recoverable sugar per ton of beets. A new
system was developed to measure the amount of
recoverable sugar by measuring the sugar loss to
molasses. The amount of sugar lost in the molasses by
product is measured as a percentage of total sugar
content. The pounds of sugar recoverable from a ton of
beets is calculated by subtracting the percentage sugar
loss to molasses from the percentage sugar content. For
example, beets with a 17.57% sugar content and a
1.495% sugar loss to molasses yield 312.5 pounds
recoverable sugar per ton of beets.
(0.1757-0.01495) x 2000 pounds per ton = 321.5
pounds per ton.
According to Balbach (1998), this new system only
used by cooperative processors, provides an efficiency
through decreasing production costs for refined sugar,
sugar loss to molasses and increasing the extraction rate
and also sugar produced per ton of beet sliced.
Two types of contracts are used by other non-
cooperative companies. The eastern contract and the
western sliding-scale contract. In the eastern contract,
growers and processors share revenues and costs at a
fixed ratio. Growers receive 53.1% of the gross sales of
sugar and by-products less 53.1% of the marketing costs.
Growers are responsible 53.1% of the sugar losses that
occur in storage. All of the production costs belong to
growers. Also, there are incentives based on the impurity
level. In the western contract, the payment per ton of
beets depends on the average net return per 100 pounds
of sugar received by the processing company and the
individual sugar contents of a grower’s beets. The
extraction rate is fixed.
3.3. A Comparative Analysis
Naturally, there are big differences between Turkish
and U.S. agricultural production and farming structure.
Turkish agriculture can be characterized as a sector in
transition from a traditional structure to an industrialized
sector. The agricultural structure in the USA is
completely industrialized. Agriculture share both in the
population and GNP is approximately 2% in the USA,
these figures are about 35% and 13% respectively in
Turkey.
In Turkey, there are more than 4 million farms
having increasing tendency in number. The average farm
size is 5 ha. In the U.S. the number of farms is only 2.1
million having a decreasing trend in number with 189.5
ha average size.
The Turkish food industry began to develop only after
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
Inevitably, establishment of the food industry was
initiated by the State as in other sectors through
establishment of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs).
This came as a result of the “ etatism” which was one of
the main principles of Turkish Development Movement.
Originally, the SEEs were supposed to operate with a
high degree of autonomy and to survive for profits as a
private entrepreneurship. After about eighty years the
SEEs are still running as State Enterprises which are
subject to privatization in recent two decades.
The lion’s share of the food is still consumed in an
unprocessed form as household production in Turkey.
The processed food share of the supply is estimated at
10-20% of food consumption. There is a dual structure
in the food industry. There are plants that are large in
size, more modern in technology, and sometimes
integrated with international companies which are
oriented mainly for export. However, a considerable
share of the food handling is realized by small and
medium size processing units which have rather
backward technologies. According the recent data there
are 25,388 firms in the industry but only 1,350 of them
have rather large capacity which have more than 10
employees.
In the USA, the food sector began a structural
transformation during the late 1800s from one that
served demand for predominantly unprocessed foods
toward a more concentrated one, handling increasing
amounts of processed foods that reached 90% of total
food consumption today. The growth in importance of
very large, capital intensive, and diversified food
manufacturing firms has been the result of the need to
achieve economies of scale in mass production and
distribution as well as control over new food processing
technologies. In 1992, there were 20,000 food
processing plants in the USA, of which 44.9% have 20Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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and more employees. There is high firm concentration in
the sector. The total sales of the nation’s top 20 food and
beverage manufacturers accounted for 52% of the
industry wide sales. The total share of the top four firms
is 20.3% in 1997.
Cooperative movement in Turkey was also started as
a Government initiative. Today, about one third of the
farmers are members of Agricultural Sale Cooperatives
(ASC) which have considerable share of the food
processing and marketing industry. Unfortunately,
despite several attempt to reorganize them,  ASC are still
running as SEEs, i.e. the member farmers have no
control over management. Some of the large processing
plants belong to these cooperatives. Instead of
establishing a democratic structure where the farmers
have the right of control and management, processing
plants of these cooperatives are considered to be
privatized.
Agricultural cooperatives have a significant role in
the agro-food system of the USA. Cooperatives have
considerable share in providing production input,
marketing of agricultural products, and food processing.
Among the marketing cooperatives, bargaining
cooperatives are special for U.S. agriculture. The
cooperative movement started in the U.S. as a private
initiative instead of direct state involvement. This
movement was supported by enacting laws that
encouraged group action in agriculture. For instance, the
Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, Cooperative Marketing
Act of 1926 as well as Agricultural Fair Practices Act of
1967 have promoted and facilitated group action in
agricultural markets.
Futures markets used to facilitate many agricultural
products have a long historical background in the USA
while these are only recently realized in Turkey despite
the availability of commodity exchanges for agricultural
products since 1892.
There are also significant differences among the
agricultural policies of Turkey and the USA. Market
intervention through support purchases for a limited
number of agricultural products, direct input subsidies,
and providing selective credit are the main agricultural
policy methods in Turkey. Besides the price support,
supply restriction, credit programs and subsidies,
marketing orders have an important role in the U.S.
As a main distinctive feature of the industrialized
agriculture in the U.S., vertical coordination through
contractual relationship is widely used. In general,
approximately one-third of the total value of agricultural
production is realized under contractual agreement.
Some sub-sector such as broiler and beet-sugar
industries are totally integrated either through
contractual relationship or vertical integration. In
Turkey, contractual relationship started to be used by the
state as a natural result of the government initiated
industry structure. Today, only beet-sugar processing is
realized under totally contractual arrangement, while in
other sub-sectors (broiler and vegetable processing)
contractual relationships have been developing parallel
to the development of the processing industry.
In the USA, there is no specific regulation at the
federal level directly related to contract farming. Many
States have proposed legislations, and some (Minnesota,
Wisconsin and Kansas) have specific legislations in
place. A special regulation on contract farming was
enacted in 1996 and later amended in 1998 in Turkey.
There are differences among the content of contract
farming legislation. In Turkey a general framework is
outlined in addition to giving responsibility to the
Ministry of Agriculture as a third party to involve in case
of disputes. Legislative arrangements in the U.S. usually
content stipulations to protect farmers rights.
There is similarity between the weak position of the
farmers in the contractual arrangements both in Turkey
and the USA, even though some of the farmers are well
organized under bargaining organizations in the States.
The content of contracts (such as payment
mechanisms) is rather comprehensive in the U.S. This
has come as a result of a long history in contracting as
compared to the contracts in Turkey. It is not surprising
to observe similarities between the general content of
contracts in the present globalized word considering the
contract production activities of some multinational
American companies (Pioneer, Philip-Morris, Cargill) in
Turkey.
4. A Cooperative Approach to Contract Farming
Outgrower schemes have been used mostly in the
developing world as a means of contract
implementation. They have a great variety with their
hybrid structure and multiple objectives. Therefore, it is
not easy to point out a standardized form for those
schemes. A simplified model is discussed here for a
standard (Private company scheme) contract production
form to have a fair and successful implementation of
contract farming for both sides, the agricultural sector
and the economy as a whole (Figure 4.1) (Rehber 1998).
First, producers/growers and integrators (handler,
processor etc.) must want to collaboration and/or
cooperate. Both for the producers and processors, it is
important to have established reputations for honesty
and fair dealing. That means, farmers should look at
integrators as partners who are working for them rather
than rivals. The same behavior is expected from the
integrators. Both sides are in need of each other in orderVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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to make a contractual relationship which is working
toward their mutual benefit. Otherwise, this cooperation
will be a source of dispute and dissatisfaction.
In contract farming systems, the individual producer
has had the most reason to feel weakness in his lack of
market power. However, the history of agriculture
demonstrates that growers have been seldom rewarded
appropriately in the market place due to weakness in
their position as farm entrepreneurs compared with other
participants in the food industry. That is why it is
important for producers to act in an organized manner.
As Anderson (1994) stated: “Recognition gained by
organized groups is better as opposed to the lack of
recognition accorded to unorganized farm producers,”
organizing a bargaining cooperative among farmers
makes them rather powerful in a contracted relationship
(Scheid 1991; Moore 1994).
Local bargaining organizations can be organized on
the regional or national level. In practice, negotiation is
an arguable problem under such organization.
Collaboration and negotiation between farmers and
processors might be better carried out in a decentralized
way i.e. at the local level. A nation wide farmer and food
industry organization could act as an administrative
organism. It could retain a role as arbitrator and
guarantee the application of private agreements.
Experimentation, development of reference, and
agricultural techniques would probably remain the
responsibility of the central body.
Such an organization also can allow collaboration
with the integrators’ organization. The producers and
processors could act together. For example California
Tomato Growers Association needed to take a more
active role in controlling imports. This led to the
formation of National Association of Growers and
Processors for Fair Trade (Marcus and Frederick 1994).
This trade group was an alliance between growers and
leading tomato processors that was successful in
initiating a negotiation between U.S. and Israel. In
general, a common action between producers and
processors` organizations can be realized to impose
regulation on imports and in some aspects; market
development, political action, and adjustments to
consumer demand.
In contractual arrangements, the role of the
integrator firm is so important by determining the most
of the production and marketing practices and measures.
Therefore the efficiency of the firms’ activities directly
affects the efficiency of contract farming. The first step
in successful implementation is establishing of a sound
organizational body. Contracts could vary from
company to company, but all must have a special unit
which is dealing with all contractual issues and is
equipped with necessary personnel and equipment. Also
its relationship to the other functions of the firm must be
determined clearly (Brown et al. 1994).
The role of government is an another important
factor for successful application of contract farming. The
first function of state authority might be legislative
arrangement. In agriculture, with a tremendous variety of
production enterprises, it is not possible to establish all
encompassed contract models which has strict rules.
Instead, governments could establish a framework for a
contract, and enact regulations to solve disputes and/or
take part in arbitration to some extent. Beneficial tax
treatment, exemption from antitrust status, selective
interest rate (below the market rate), and free technical
assistance through extension services could be listed
among the Government’s policies favorable to
cooperatives.
The direct role of government in the contractual
mechanism, agricultural support and intervention
policies aimed at improving contract farming can be
effective and functional. In the USA, for example, some
product marketing orders reinforce the bargaining
strength of farmers. In the European Union, according to
the Commission Regulation, the production aid system is
based on contracts between producers and processors and
the particulars to be included in the contracts for the
purposes of the aid system should be specified
(Anonymous 1984).
Tax policy is an another aspect which must be
considered to promote contract farming. Contract
farming can be considered a way of record keeping
systems. Farmers are presently reluctant to involve in
such arrangements for fear that they may pay more taxes
especially in countries where book keeping is not
compulsory for the family farms. Therefore adopting a
tax policy which facilities the situation could be
recommended.
On one hand, specialization to produce a single
product through contract farming has increased the
profitability level. On the other hand it will increase the risk
farmers face. Agricultural crop insurance policies could be
a considerable way to promote risks reduction for both
farmers and processors.
Ineffective extension and training policies of the
governments could be improved through contract
farming. Credit policies in agriculture also could be
realized by contractual arrangements. For example it is
possible to consider the contract itself as collateral. Such
activities linked with the contractual relationship could
be rather effective.
An independent organization to resolve disputes
between firms and farmers, which are the major causes
for failure in contract farming is recommended. SolvingVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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disagreements and disputes over quality standards,
delays in delivery and payments, and default on loans
through the court systems creates long delays. An
arbitration and/or a conciliation system would be useful
by involving government and non-governmental
organizations (Spolter 1992). In arbitration, an arbitrator
renders a decision and third party imposes it taking all
the control away from the parties. In a conciliation or
mediation process, the parties retain control of the
process and the outcome.
5. Conclusions and Suggestions for Marketing
Efficiency
The agro-food sector from producer to consumer
involves a range of discrete and complementary
activities changing from farm input procurement to
consumption. The vertical relationships between these
activities range from open market transactions to vertical
integration. Over time impersonal and open-market
transactions between activities in traditional agro-food
systems based on price signals are replaced by rather
controlled, impersonal vertical coordination mechanisms
such as organizing cooperatives, short and long-term
contractual relationships, and ownership integration in
the advanced and industrialized systems. Changes in
food consumer preferences, attitudes, technological
improvements, food safety issues and related regulations
are main forces behind industrialization
In light of investigated theories, one of the main
reasons for vertical integration is transaction costs.
Vertical coordination through ownership integration
decreases transaction costs but creates its own costs.
Some distinctive features inherent in production of
agricultural commodities and markets favored the use of
contractual relationships in agriculture versus full-
integration (ownership integration). However, even in
ownership integration, internalizing all transactions in a
firm does not preclude the use of contracts, i.e. a firm
can have all production assets or have complete control
of them but need to hire labor and use labor contracts. In
the cooperative structure, the relationship between
member producers and their own organization
(cooperatives) often requires formal linkages more
constitutive than contractual relationships. On the other
hand, specialization in one of the stages of the agro-food
chain can provide cost advantages. Therefore,
coordination among the specialized firms through
contractual arrangements or even open-market
relationships may be more efficient versus ownership
integration.
In practice it is not possible to have a complete
contract because it is not possible to foresee all
contingencies in advance (bounded rationality), it is
difficult to describe and write these contingencies
accurately and there will be a cost for writing down such
a plan and realizing it and solving disputes. In practice,
contingencies inevitably arise that have not been
planned. In this case, parties must find ways to adopt.
These adaptations introduce the possibility of
opportunism. In general terms, incomplete
characteristics of the contracts lead to problems of
imperfect commitment. Under information asymmetry,
there will be a moral hazard problem which limits the
contracts that can be written and enforced.
Asset specificity, task programmability and
separability are primary determinants of the degree and
type of vertical coordination (governance structure). In
the contractual relationship, the length and the
comprehensiveness of contracts are dependant on the
above features. In the case of high asset specificity that
cause sunk cost may create a hold-up problem. Another
important determinant is uncertainty regarding
production and marketing.
It is a fact that the role of successful management
(strategic management) is very important for efficiency
in every kind of vertical coordination. Improvements in
managerial approaches in relationships for both intra-
firm and inter-firm transactions based on trust,
confidence and mutual understanding could be
interpreted critical issues in financial and economic
efficiency. Legal and/or incentive systems based on
reward and penalties can be used creating trust and
mutual confidence. Desired method is availability of
coordination consciousness that the processor (principal)
needs a group of producers (agents) as much as the
producer needs the processor as explained in our
cooperative model.
Quality and quality control is one of the important
issues in every stage of the agro-food chain. A quality
convention is required among the transaction parties in
these stages. Quality requirements can be best defined
and controlled by a third party, government and/or
independent organizations along with the internal
convention in the food chain.
In general, both for farmers and integrators, one of
the significant reasons for contract production is to
decrease uncertainties (risks). Under contract integration,
producers bear some of the production risks, but price
risks for the contracted commodity and most variable
inputs are transferred to the integrator. A guaranteed
market, easy access to credit facilities, and information
are among the reasons for contracting for producers. For
integrators the main reason is to provide a steady input
supply with a certain quality and quantity.
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, recentVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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sophisticated ideas such as environmentally sound,
sustainable agriculture, and standards and regulations
related to environment and health safety are the
initiatives behind the fast growing close vertical
coordination and contract farming.
The reduction in producer’s and integrator’s risks
are replaced by other risks and problems related to the
implementation of contracts. Integrators can force
changes in operation at will since there is no contract
provisions to prevent such changes. For instance, broiler
growers often complain that these changes are
sometimes are excessively expensive but they have no
choice since they already have large sunk investments.
In Turkey, the group approach and extra debt receipts for
inputs provided by integrators create problems for the
producers. Generally, contracts are prepared by the
integrators and often the language is used that is not
easily understandable by the producers. The contract is
generally in written form, but the explicit terms of
contracts reflected in the documents are only part of the
story. That is, some of the provisions are implicitly used
by the integrators. Other more common claims of the
producers include contract termination, manipulation of
quality, quantity or cost of inputs, and mis-evaluation of
production performance. Some of the contractual
relationships create new legal arguments. For instance,
in poultry production, contracts do not involve sale of
commodities. Instead they create other forms of legal
relationships as service contracts. That means contract
growers are not the owner of the product, but are
compensated for their land, building, labor and some
small part of the production cost.
For integrators, the inability of producers to meet the
technical requirements of contracts, quality problems,
disputes related to payment and other contract terms, and
ex-post contract negotiation are primary concerns and
sources of risk.
Some conditions can outweigh the advantages of
contract farming. In contractual arrangements, the role of
the integrator firm is so important as it determines
contract terms (most of the production and marketing
practices and measures). Therefore, the efficiency of the
firms’ activities directly affects the efficiency of contract
farming. The first step in successful implementation is
establishing a sound organizational body in the
contractor firms. Contracts could vary from company to
company, but all of them must have a special unit
dealing with all contractual issues equipped with
necessary personnel and equipment. Also, its
relationship to the other functions of the firm must be
determined clearly.
It is recommended that there should be an
independent organization to resolve disputes between
firms and farmers, which are the major causes for failure
in contract farming. Solving disagreements and disputes
between producers and processors created long delays
while going to court. Thus, an arbitration and/or a
reconciliation system would be useful by involving
government and non-governmental representatives.
One of the clear findings of the case studies for
Turkey and the USA is that the fewer and larger
processors have created a monopsonistic, anti-
competitive market structure. Having title of the
product's (broiler industry) market information and
production know-how as well as large market shares
strengthened their position in the market against farmers.
If we assume that packers or processors are closer to
retailers and consumers, they have better market
information than producers, this gives them bargaining
power. In such structures the individual farmer is in a
weak position at the bargaining table.
Antitrust oversight and related legislation may be
seen as the first attempt to cope with the anti-
competitive effects created by processors (integrators).
The necessity of such attempts are not deniable, but it is
a fact that it is not possible to control and regulate
economic systems in every case.
One possible alternative for farmers is to forge
alliances among producers and to establish processing
and marketing cooperatives as in Turkey and the USA.
These directly assure access to available markets and
enhance net returns. Availability of producer
cooperatives in the market as an alternative also creates a
countervailing power when facing the corporate
monopsonistic behavior. It was observed in beet-sugar
industries both in Turkey and the USA that vertical
integration of some processing companies by growers
had real efficiency consequences.
Another significant way of strengthening farmer’s
bargaining power is the establishment of bargaining
cooperatives as in the USA. Organizing a bargaining
cooperative among farmers make them rather powerful
in contractual relationships. Such an organization could
also give an opportunity to collaborate with the
integrators’ organization. The producers and processors
could act together. For example, California Tomato
Growers Association needed to take a more active role in
controlling imports. This led to the formation of
National Association of Growers and Processors for Fair
Trade. This attempt was successful in imposing
regulation on imports and in other aspects, such as
market development, political action, and making
adjustments to consumer demand.
While the role of the government is an important
factor for successful implementation, it is not possible to
establish a comprehensive contract model via legislationVertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report #52 32
which has strict rules due to the existence of tremendous
variety of enterprises in agriculture. Instead, the
government could determine a framework for the
contracts and enact regulation to solve disputes and take
part in arbitration or a reconciliation group.
The most direct way for the government to address
production contract issues is to regulate them
specifically. Both in Turkey (national level) and in the
USA (some states), governments have begun to regulate
contract relationships either by establishing requirements
or by requiring that legal disputes go through mediation
before one party can take the issue to court.
Governments can also require annual reports by
contractors to gather more information about contracting
and they can require registration or certification of
certain entities that engage in contracting. For instance,
licensing enables the government to control the use of
certain practices more directly and to require the use of
standardized contracts.
Government can also use indirect methods to
encourage or facilitate contract producers’ abilities to
organize and bargain for more favorable contract terms
as in some States of the USA.
In addition to the general conclusions summarized
above, some specific measures could be proposed to
have a more industrialized and vertically coordinated
agro-food system and a well functioning contract
farming in Turkey.
• There is a need for more comprehensive empirical
studies (commodity level) to better model the structure
and related problems of vertical coordination and
contract farming.
• Collecting nation-wide data related to the different
aspects of contract farming should be included in the
General Agricultural Census as in the USA.
10
• Government resources used in ineffective ways such
as for price support, input subsidy and selective credit
policies should be devoted to establishing a sound
marketing and processing infrastructure through
organizations which are owned and controlled by the
producers.
• Available Agricultural Sale Cooperatives should be
rearranged so that the producers have control of their
cooperatives. That is, the direct involvement of the
government in such organizations must be replaced with
indirect support policies.
• Wholesale markets for the fresh fruits and
vegetables must be reorganized. The structure of the
present Commodity Exchanges must be changed by the
                                                       
10 The Bureau of Census began collecting information about
contracts in a sample survey following the 1959 Census of
Agriculture in the USA.
establishment of futures markets as in the USA.
• Instead of privatization of the present food
processing State Economic Enterprises, especially in the
backward regions of Turkey, these should be
reorganized as producer owned firms through
cooperative or stock companies.
• Government policies regarding tax, credit,
agricultural insurance and especially extension, must be
evaluated to create a convenient environment. For
instance, in US, the marketing orders have been
strengthening the farmers’ position in the contractual
relationships.
• Both producers and integrators have to improve their
understanding and attitude about contracts and
contractual relationships. Each has to be informed about
the legal and technical issues related to contract farming
through efficient government extension programs.
Finally, it can be concluded that contractual
relationships are not only a distinctive feature of
highly industrialized agro-food systems, but also a
way for establishing an industrialized structure. In
the developing countries such as Turkey, contract
farming should be evaluated as a way to provide easier
access to credit, inputs, information, technology, and
product markets for small scale farmers. Contract
farming also contribute to development of a sound food
industry.
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Table 2.1. Predicting the Organizational Form of Vertical Integration
Task Programmability
Low High
L. A. Specificity H. A. Specificity L. A. Specificity H. A. Specificity
Low Spot market Long-term contract Spot market Joint venture Non-
Separability High Relational
contracting
Hierarchy Inside contract Hierarchy
Source: Mahoney, 1992, page 576.












    Relational Contracting
Source: Williamson, O.E., 1979, page 253.
Table 3.1.  Size Distribution of the Food Processing Firms
    1983   1987 1991 1996 Size Category








     6
 310
 142
   65
   60
   16
   17




    9.7
    2.6
    2.8
      3
  300
  124
    97
    53
    24
    19




    8.6
    3.8
    3.1
    12
  262
  111
    86
    64
    35












    68




    9.3
    7.5
    5.0
    3.3
    0.9
Total    616 100.0   620 100.0      584 100.0    1350 100.0
Source: TR, State Institute of Statistics, Annual Manufacturing Industry Statistics, 1983, 1987,19 91, 1996.Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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Table 3.2. Size Distribution of Food Processing Plants
1963 1987 1992 Size
Category
(Employees)
Numbers      % Numbers   % Numbers      %
     1-19
   20-49





  6 862
  3 365
  2 768




   9.0
   7.4
   2.7
    0.3
10 895
  3 731
  2 337
  2 236
  1 260





    6.1
    0.6
11 469
  3 569
  2 147
  2 139
  1 317
     157
   55.1
   17.2
   10.4
   10.3
     6.3
     0.7
Total 37 521 100.0 20 583 100.0 20 798  100.0
Sources: J. M. Connor and W. A. Schiek, 1997, page 85, and Bureau of the Census, 1992 Census of Manufactures, Table 1-4.
Table 3.3. Contract Production and Vertical Integration in the USA Food Industry
Contract Production Vertical Integration Commodity







  Food grain
  Feed grain
Specialty crops
  Processed vegetables
  Fresh vegetables
  Potatoes
  Citrus
  Other fruit and nuts
Total farm output
       92
       60
         1
         7
        2
        1
      85
      21
      45
      84
      20
      28.2
      92
      65
      11
        7
        7
        7
      88
      25
      55
      70
      35
      30.5
      7
    12
       1
     12
       1
       1
     10
     30
     25
       9
     20
       5.3
      8
    28
      6
    28
      1
      1
      9
    40
    40
      8
    25
      7.6
Source: S.W. Martinez and Al Reed, 1996, page 5.
Table 3.4. Number of the Dairy Cooperatives by 1992-1997
           1992          1997
Cooperatives
Number     % Number   %
Processes and manufacturing co. 86   32.5  63   27.8
Milk receiving stations 44   16.6  25   11.0
Bargaining cooperatives       135   50.9      138   61.2
Total       265 100.0      226 100.0
Source: K.C.Ling, 1999.Vertical Coordination and Contract Farming Rehber
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